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Introduction
Broadcast television began in the mid-1930s, as an evolution of radio-diffusion
technologies. It then developed as a mass media in the second half of the
twentieth century. Economic and institutional aspects were central to this
development process, and explain the existence of radically different trajec-
tories of evolution.
Indeed, Starr 2005 shows that as the market for media and other cultural
goods expanded, early institutional differences led to path divergences in the
communication and media industries in Europe and United States. He ex-
plains that the path of telecommunications in America originates from the
country’s foundation as a liberal republic and its response to the challenges
of building a nation on a wide, continental scale.
For instance, the geography of American cities very quickly favoured broad-
casting via the cable over the terrestrial spectrum, as mountains and build-
ings would block TV signals1. Regulation very early on required operators
to relay TV broadcasts via cable networks, especially to access remote areas.
Cable began to develop separately from free television in the 1970s with the
deregulation of the industry.
The essence of the divergence of national trajectories is linked to the dif-
ference in the assessment of positive and negative externalities related to
communication, and to the media, which depend on the specific institutional
history of each country. Starr describes this phenomenon without using the
notion of externalities, for instance by pointing out that the development of
telecommunications in the Soviet Union is structured by the State interests,
and the priority given to broadcasting and vertical communications rather
than horizontal technologies such as the telephone. The French trajectory is
also extremely interesting in that regard: the French audiovisual industry is
strongly structured by the State, through arbitrary decisions about resource
allocation (see chapter 1). In a sense, it can be compared to a limited access
1History of Cable Television, National Cable & Telecommunications Association, 2010
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order (D. C. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009), as the State controls access
to property and organizations. The trajectory of evolution of the regulation
in France produced a relatively closed industrial ecosystem, dominated by
terrestrial broadcasting, as cable and satellite have not been able to estab-
lish as major technologies. This ecosystem is particularly impacted by the
opening of accesses and entry of over-the-top players, which operates a form
of destructive creation, or of what Starr describes as a de facto opening of a
restrictive system, eroding the legacies of State control.
Television is linked to historically dated technical systems, and has known
a mediatic use that structured the development of its economic activity. For
a long time, television broadcast was the only system allowing the distribu-
tion of moving images, or audiovisual content to individual households, or
consumers. It was built as a flow of programs, structured around a specific
schedule, creating specific rendez-vous for the spectator. As a media offering
a bundle of different programs, it maintains cross-externalities effects with
other media, for instance music (variety shows), news, sports, but more im-
portantly with cinema. Cinema has long been used as a source of content
for television, as broadcasting movies was a way of ensuring high audiences.
Television also contributes largely to the financing of cinema: in France,
the relationships between television broadcasters and movie producers were
regulated in the early 1980s with the concession of terrestrial frequencies.
Pay-TV then became the main source of funding for French movies. As a
result, it is essential to study the cinema economy in France to discuss the
audiovisual ecosystem.
The audiovisual industry can be considered as an industry of development
and production of narratives, or stories, which can be for instance fictional
(movies, TV series...), event-driven (news), or linked to the broadcasting of
sports events. The common feature of these stories is that they are intended
to be made public. Television is their primary medium of distribution, and
sells bundles of narratives to the spectator. In that sense, we speak of the
audiovisual industry for the production of such content, as it is linked to a
technical broadcasting system.
Most of these audiovisual goods require high fixed costs, up to several tens
of millions of euros for the production and distribution of a movie. On the
other hand, their marginal cost is extremely low. In that sense, programs
have a prototype dimension: the first copy is infinitely more expensive to
produce than the following ones. However, TV installed recurrences, series
of programs creating economies of scale in production that are superior to
those of cinema. Overall, the capital-intensity of programs varies greatly.
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Maybe one of the more specific characteristics of audiovisual stories, which
they share with most mediatic goods is the fact that their value lies in their
semantic content, in the message, information or narrative they convey, and
how these combine with technical systems.
The audiovisual industry can be included in the broader category of cul-
tural industries, which generally includes printing, publishing, multimedia,
as well as crafts and design. Cultural goods are considered as a type ex-
perience goods. Before consumption, consumers are unable to estimate the
utility these goods will give them. This notion is defined by Nelson 1970,
by opposition to search goods, whose qualities can be determined before pur-
chase.
The consumer will then rely on prior experience or on other derived infor-
mation to evaluate their utility ex ante. This ignorance is symmetrical, and
implies a significant risk of commercial failure. Caves 2000 shows that one
of the key characteristics of such industries is that it is extremely difficult to
predict consumer reaction to a new cultural work (“Nobody Knows”). This
explains the importance of consumer information and market signaling with
regards to such goods (mediatization), the media notoriety can then be seen
as a quality signal, as well as this of the artist, or producer.
Experience goods are also generally linked to some kind of learning or
habitual effects, in the sense that the more of the specific good is consumed,
the greater the utility. Consumers’ preferences are thus endogenous. A par-
ticularly strong version of this assumption is developed by Stigler and G. S.
Becker 1977. They allege that individuals start with identical preferences,
and that all differences in individual choices can be explained by prior ex-
perience, or constraints faced by these individuals, which differs from the
traditional view in economics that preferences are given as exogenous.
Widespread and/or persistent human behavior can be explained
by a generalized calculus of utility-maximizing behavior, without
introducing the qualification “tastes remaining the same.”
Stigler and G. S. Becker 1977
Blaug 2001 shows that this theory has been heavily discussed in the field
of cultural economics. Numerous empirical studies point to this endogenous
formation of taste for the arts and other cultural goods: Baumol and Bowen
1966 show that audience for the arts strongly depend on the level of edu-
cation and age above other personal characteristics. O’Hagan 1996 shows
how early exposure to arts accounts for later participation. This idea that
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cultural goods are a type of experience goods sometimes leads to rational
addiction types of analysis (see chapter 3).
This inability to predict demand for such goods has led the media to be
described as a “nobody knows industry” (Goldman 1989). The literature on
predicting the success of films screened in movie theaters leads to the conclu-
sion of the radical uncertainty of the sector. De Vany 2004, Ginsburgh and
Throsby 2006 show that this uncertainty with regards to demand structures
the industrial organization of cinema. The high risk associated with investing
in production also leads to consolidation strategies on the part of producers
(Maskell and Lorenzen 2004), and explains the relative concentration of the
production ecosystem (see chapters 2 and 4).
All of these variables create the idiosyncrasy of the institutional and in-
dustrial trajectory of the French audiovisual ecosystem, which is the focus
of this thesis. The central question of this work is to describe, in the case
of France, the industrial organization, the institutions, and the industrial
ecosystem associated with the development of television. The interest of this
study lies in the fact that this is one of the sectors most impacted by re-
cent industrial innovations (digitization, high speed internet access...), and
is ideal-typical of the industrial and institutional transformations and adap-
tations resulting from technological change.
The development of information and communication technologies has led to
gradual transformations in this industry. It is now experiencing a strong
shake up, linked to the entry of a wave of new players, bypassing traditional
broadcasting technologies. We try to explain how the French ecosystem is
coping with this change, and provide conjectures on the future of the industry.
This thesis consists of four chapters, organized as follows:
• Chapter 1 aims at defining the notions used in this thesis, as well as
to present the specific trajectory of evolution of the French audiovi-
sual industry. Each country has a particular way of managing media
activities, which generates a lot of externalities, both positive and neg-
ative. For instance, the US never had State television, while the UK
developed on a hybrid public/private model. The importance of initial
conditions and industrial path in the development of television leads
us to consider the precise definitions associated with this media, its in-
dustrial organization and institutional framework before studying how
it is affected by the entry of over the top players.
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• The French regulation introduced with the concession of a terrestrial
broadcasting licence to a private operator resulted in a unique copy-
right structure, and in automatic support mechanisms for the cinema,
and later on for the audiovisual production through mandatory invest-
ments. It is therefore important to consider the effects of this system on
the broadcasters’ investment strategies. Chapter 2 presents an analysis
of the regulated funding of the French audiovisual works and cinema
by the broadcasters. We provide evidence that, by transferring most
of the risk towards the investor, the current regulation may negatively
affect the financing diversity of the industry by creating incentives for
broadcasters to invest on the bigger producers to minimize the risk of
a financial loss.
• Chapter 3 focuses more on the demand side, and discusses the effect
of narrative writing on consumption patterns. We study the strategies
for the broadcasting of fiction in France, and show the importance of
the narrative structure of such works to keep the attention of the con-
sumer. TV series expanded quite early in the United States, with satel-
lite pay-TV, while this format was overshadowed by cinema in France.
The recent growth in popularity for TV series, and more generally
for serialized narratives raises some questions about their consumption
and monetization. We provide evidence that the consumption of such
programs is consistent with the rational addiction framework.
• The previous chapters describe an ecosystem strongly structured by
the regulation resulting from the liberalization of State television in the
early 1980s. The growth of the television market created a positive-sum
game between broadcasters and producers. The entry of new players,
bypassing traditional distribution channels, is disrupting the industrial
organization of the sector and compromising the status quo.
The purpose of chapter 4 is to study how this ecosystem, marked by a
strong path-dependency, adapts to the new paradigm imposed by the
platforms.
5
Chapter 1
Definitions and perimeter of
the thesis
1.1 Media and network effects
Media refers to both a technical and symbolic dimension. First, the media
refers to a technical means of communication allowing the transmission of
a message1, or to a support for the massive diffusion of information (press,
radio, television, cinema). Media may also refer to the product of these
techniques (newspapers, movies, broadcasts).
Every media is associated with a publishing protocol (Olivier Bomsel
2013), which identifies the sender of the message, contextualizes the story
and gives it a public dimension.
Thus, from the point of view of communication, disregarding technical con-
siderations, we can say that a media is a message intended for use by a wide
audience. In this sense, we believe it is necessary to separate the category of
media from that of correspondence, or exchange which only concerns private
and identified agents. This separation is due to the fact that these two cate-
gories present different externalities profiles, and protocols. Correspondence,
as a form of communication between two identified agents, is associated with
positive externalities. Transactional risks (lies, asymmetry of information)
are managed with the identification of communicating agents, and by repu-
tation effects. Correspondence systems can be funded by the contributions
of agents (postal stamp, telephone subscription).
On the other hand publication refers to different protocols and externality
profiles. A single emitter sends a message to a public of several agents, who
1Christophe Piar, Me´dias - Vue d’ensemble, Encyclopædia Universalis
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may or may not be identified. Media follows publishing protocols in which the
message is constructed before being made public, and whose publication itself
produces additional value, or meaning. Marketing processes are examples of
such protocols: for instance the marketing strategy for the first Macintosh
computer, accompanied by a large advertising campaign, launched by the
broadcast a spot at the first commercial break of the Super Bowl half time
illustrates the additional value, or meaning created by the editorial protocol.
Other examples include the construction of a narrative around football play-
ers’ performance in a championship, which give additional value to both the
players and the championship itself.
In that sense, mediatization means to add meaning to a message, or
product through a publication operation. Media produces meaning through
a publicizing operation that is dependent on a specific technical system. Me-
diatization contributes both to adding meaning, as a public image that can
be considered a complementary good (see G. S. Becker and K. M. Murphy
1993), but also giving the product coverage. The originality of Steve Job’s
protocol when launching new Apple products is that the publication event
caused by paid advertising leads to large news coverage (ie. free advertising).
To publish amounts to creating and spreading a narrative which is comple-
mentary to the published product.
Media ecosystems consist, among other things, of technical systems, linked
by standards and norms, which determine the publication, and access to the
message (eg. the frequencies of the terrestrial spectrum for television). In
addition, there are externalities between publishing systems, which combine
effects of meaning and add value to those messages (Olivier Bomsel 2015).
More specifically, consumption of cultural and media content is associ-
ated with network externalities: the public circulation of information gen-
erates external effects, both positive (sharing of knowledge, coordination,
synchronization, social norms...) and negative (disinformation, rumors, fake
news, incitement to crime...). This explains the organization of media in
ecosystems, as this form of industrial organization allows the internalization
of these externalities (Olivier Bomsel 2013). A good or service is said to carry
network externalities when the utility given by its consumption depends on
that of other agents (Katz and Shapiro 1985). By extension, network in-
dustries are industries that produce goods or services that generate network
effects, including telecommunications, video games and media. They share
some key characteristics, such as the importance of technical standards, high
switching costs, and path-dependency effects (Pierson 1997).
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Media benefit from the network externalities of distribution systems, but
also from the social benefits associated with sharing a meaningful experience
(Frank and Cook 1995). For instance, the popularity of some cultural goods
has been linked to a form of superstar effect (Rosen 1981, Adler 1985): an
artist’s success depends on their adoption by a critical mass of consumers, and
positive network externalities generate an increasing dynamic of investment,
regardless of the quality or talent of the artist. Similarly, in the sociological
literature, Dutt 2009 has linked the value of consumption of cultural goods
to positive network externalities. Di Maggio and Garip 2011 discuss the dif-
fusion of cultural consumption practices within groups, and model it as a
direct consequence of positive network externalities.
The transmission of messages from a distance, and their almost instantaneous
reception by a massive audience is also a central issue for political authorities.
Media are an instrument used by political and economic actors to try and
impose on public opinion, and change their perception by voters, or potential
customers. Motta and Polo 1997 show that the government is interested in
the content of television programs as they influence the evaluation of its own
actions. A rational government aiming at increasing its chances of re-election
will try to affect the type and content of television broadcasts. If there is a
public broadcasting company, the government could place more importance
on obtaining favourable treatment than on ensuring the company’s efficiency
and independence. Hence, in each country, institutions encouraging the pro-
duction of meaningful information have been completed with censorship.
1.2 Institutions and institutional change
The neo-institutionalist2 approach in economics has been developing since
the 1980s, based on the notion of transaction costs, and inspired by the work
of Coase, (1937, 1960), of D. North 1981, on the institutional conditions of
economic growth, and of Williamson (1975).
D. C. North 1990 defines the notion of institution as a set of formal and
informal rules that specify the available strategies to each relevant player and
the benefits associated with each of these strategies.
According to D. C. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, the top priority of
2Claude Me´nard, E´conomie (Histoire de la pense´e e´conomique) - Ne´o-
institutionnalisme, Encyclopædia Universalis
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societies is to contain violence, a priority that goes beyond individual free-
dom or prosperity issues. To achieve this, societies establish a social order,
an organization that delegates the practice of violence to a specific group.
Institutions result from this social order, and are reflected and made public
by the media. In open access orders, in which, the economy is decoupled
from politics, the media organize competition in the economy and in politi-
cal representation, to ensure the access stays open.
Shepsle 1989 explains that the institutions have a goal of improving
cooperation and facilitating the consolidation of agreements (ie. reduce
transaction costs). Rational choice theoreticians3 generally use institutions
to explain stability of a political system. The stability of an institution
would depend on its effectiveness in allocating resources, maximizing wel-
fare...However, it appears that inefficiency is not a sufficient condition for
institutional change. Shepsle 1989 distinguishes institutions whose ineffi-
ciency requires abandonment from those that can be modified according to
their own rules, which he calls a robust institution. As an example, the
French regulatory system for audiovisual broadcasting could be considered
such a robust institution, as it was able to internalize the transformations
linked to digitization in the early 2000s (see chapter 4).
After a long period of stability, it is possible that the institutional struc-
ture will stiffen, and lead to inefficiencies (Leonard-Barton 1992, Lieberman
and Montgomery 1988 also speak of “incumbent inertia” to illustrate these
inefficiencies). In fact, institutions can be robust, not because they corre-
spond optimally to the tastes of players and to the environment, but because
transaction costs set too high a price for alternative arrangements.
This raises the question of reforms, and institutional change. A reform
can be seen as a specific investment aimed at altering the constituent rules
of an institution (Lagroye and Offerle´ 2011).
A reform therefore involves specific costs: building a reform project, finding
coalitions of support, negotiating compromises...
According to North, reforms are responses by the institution and groups
of actors within it to exogenous shocks, when maintaining existing rules is
a sub-optimal strategy leading to a reduction in the function performed by
the institution, its effectiveness, or its legitimacy (D. C. North 1990).
Wars, economic crises, pandemics, or technological mutations can make the
3see for instance Knight and Sened 1995
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rules inappropriate or transform the preferences of actors. For instance, the
development of new information technologies led to wide reforms in the ad-
ministrations, especially in their interface with the users (Dunleavy et al.
2005). Another example of such exogenous shocks leading to institutional
reforms is the impact of globalization and European integration, leading to
plans to reduce public expenditure and reorganize administrative institutions
(Boyer 2000).
These exogenous factors may also lead to the unblocking of an institutional
status quo. Scharpf 2005 shows how the worsening economic crisis in Ger-
many has reduced the political return on the blocking strategies employed
by the opposition, and made it possible to consider a reform of the joint
decision-making system characteristic of German federalism. We use a simi-
lar reasoning to show how the entry of international platform in the French
ecosystem may unlock the blocked institutional situation.
The persistence of an institution, or the difficulty of carrying out a reform,
even in the face of exogenous shocks can be explained by path-dependency
effects: once established, the rules of the institutional game generate self-
reinforcing dynamics (Pierson 1997, Rosenberg 1994). As a result, a more
effective arrangement than the existing institution, or one that better mirrors
the players preferences is not necessarily adopted. Pierson 1997 takes the
example of the Welfare State institutions, and demonstrates the long lasting
effects of the creation of these institutions. Once a path is taken, it extremely
difficult to switch. He identifies four self-reinforcement mechanisms that
characterize economic processes that generate economies of scale, which he
links to path-dependency.
1. Large fixed costs: technological or institutional innovation implies
significant fixed costs
2. Learning effects: Skills and knowledge acquired lead to increasing
returns
3. Coordination effects (network externalities): facilitate the adoption
of a single institutional or technical solution
4. Adaptive expectations: investing in unsuccessful technology can be
costly (a direct consequence of network externalities) .
For North, path dependency is directly linked to institutional constraints.
Institutional change means losing the increasing returns on initial invest-
ments, and no longer being coordinated with other institutions.
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Wilsford 1994 takes the example of health care systems reforms to show that
in path dependent models, institutions and structure channel actors along
specific policy paths. He shows that in such systems, any non incremental
change is unlikely.
Thus, it is clear that the reproduction of institutional arrangements is
more easily ensured than their change (Lagroye and Offerle´ 2011). In such
situations, the beneficiaries of the rules in effect focus on defending institu-
tional rents, and can permanently block developments that would be desir-
able for a large majority of players. In other words, as any reform project is
interpreted by the players as likely to modify their utility or profit, it will gen-
erate mobilizations, coalitions or vetoes from different groups (Tsebelis 2002).
Knight and Sened 1995 show that the stability and the sustainability of
an institution is explained by it’s ability to provide distributional benefits to
those who have the power or the authority to change it. Ultimately, reform-
ing institutions may require such investments in information and negotiation
that players will prefer the status quo (Shepsle 1989).
This type of blocked situation is classic in the study of institutions. For
instance, Pierson 1994 works on the reforms of the 1980s in Great Britain
and the United States aimed at dismantling the welfare state. He describes
institutional lock-in phenomena, characterized by the robustness of pension
systems linked to the ability of interest groups (here pensioners or veterans)
to oppose reform and defend the institutions. On the other hand, the benefi-
ciaries of change are unaware of the benefits they could derive from it and are
less committed to reforming. From 1981 to 1987, the Reagan reforms have
failed due to the activism of the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP).
We describe a similar situation with regards to the French audiovisual
ecosystem in chapter 4. The core of the institution, defined by its previ-
ous path is the most difficult to attack by the reform. For instance, recent
reform projects for the French audiovisual regulation have only led to grad-
ual change. In that sense, Palier and Bonoli 1999 distinguish path-shifting
reforms from reforms that actually strengthen existing institutional configu-
rations (path-dependent change).
The links between media and institutions are twofold. First, institutions
depend on the media to make the rules public. Institutions also set up
the rules of media activities to monitor their externalities. The industrial
organisations of media depend on the rules that have been set up to monitor
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these externalities. For instance, the different institutional paths described
by Starr 2005 correspond to different ways of dealing with media externalities.
On the other hand, media contribute to lowering the transaction costs of
institutions, facilitating coordination and achieving economies of scale.
1.3 Ecosystems
The term ecosystem is used in biology to refer to a system of living organ-
isms and their interaction with non-living elements in their environment.
This category is first presented in 1935, defined as a set of populations liv-
ing in the same environment and having multiple interactions between them
(Tansley 1935). Similarly, Willis 1997 defines an ecosystem as a network of
interactions between organisms, and between these organisms and their envi-
ronment. This notion takes a global perspective, considering each ecosystem
as a coherent object of study, characterized by a structure and dynamics that
differ from the sum of its parts.
The study of ecosystems, based on the exchange of energy and matter, can
be generalized to many objects, outside of the fields of biology and ecology.
Thus, Teece 2007 introduces the notion of the business ecosystem, which ap-
plies to a community of economic agents, interacting with each other, within
a framework favourable to externalities. The ecosystem is defined as “a num-
ber of companies, producing competing or complementary goods that work
together to create a new market and produce goods and services that have
value for customers”.
The notion of ecosystem in economics can also be seen as a generalization
of systemness (Rosenberg 1994), as an ecosystem can consist of hardware,
software and technical standards: for instance the success of the Apple brand
can be attributed in part to its specific hardware and software elements, al-
lowing integration and synchronization between multiple devices. We define
here an economic ecosystem as a set of heterogeneous economic agents (firms,
institutions, technical elements), linked both by contractual relations and ex-
ternal effects. This notion of ecosystem differs from the categories of industry,
market, or sector, as it is based on the prevalence of externalities and non-
contractual relationships.
It is important to distinguish the notion of ecosystem from this of cluster4.
4We understand cluster here in the statistical sense, as a group of objects or agents that
are more similar, or closer to each other than to those in other groups/clusters. A cluster
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The notion of business ecosystems may be used to characterize companies or
players interacting through a certain geographical proximity.
In media ecosystems, the players belong to different sectors of activity, may
have divergent interests, and may not share any geographic proximity. Me-
dia ecosystems are characterized by the interdependence of several separate
markets, some of them two-, or multi-sided. In such markets, several groups
of agents interact through a third party, or platform. The literature explores
the pricing choices of these platforms when there is some form of network in-
terdependence or externality between several groups of agents5. For instance,
advertisers (on one side of the market) are concerned about the number of
viewers (on the other side of the market) that a television channel (the plat-
form) can attract. The channel sets prices for viewers and advertisers taking
into account these crossover network effects. These network effects can lead
to coordination problems (Spulber 2010). This is why intermediaries or plat-
forms develop strategies to internalize these effects: minimizing transaction
costs, price internalization, etc.
1.4 From State monopoly to media platforms:
institutional trajectory of the French au-
diovisual ecosystem
1.4.1 Initial conditions: the State monopoly
The institutional context of the public audiovisual sector in the 1950’s created
the initial conditions for the path leading to the current industrial organiza-
tion. The French audiovisual sector developed around a public model, under
close control from the State since the early 1960s. The Radio Te´le´vision
Franc¸aise, created in 1949 becomes an autonomous entity in 1959 but is still
under the supervision of the the ministry of information, and its director is
appointed by the Council of Ministers.
Chevalier 1990 shows that the establishment of this State monopoly is
mostly based on political arguments, as the terrestrial spectrum is a rare
asset, distributed among States by means of international conventions, and
of firms would imply some sense of proximity, for instance in the geographical sense, but
not necessarily the existence of externalities and/or non-contractual effects
5Rochet and Tirole 2003 argue that a market is two-sided if the platform can affect the
volume of transactions by charging more on one side of the market and reducing the price
paid by the other side by an equal amount.
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whose use is too closely related to national sovereignty to be abandoned to
private initiative. He then explains that as broadcasting techniques evolved,
other concerns were highlighted: the importance of television as an instru-
ment of political and cultural information would require that it be protected
from pressure from interest groups. The argument put forward was that only
public management would be able to ensure the pluralistic expression of ideas
and guarantee the quality of programs.
Janin 2010 shows that there is also a technical argument for this state
monopoly on terrestrial frequencies. Due to the interference that may ex-
ist between frequencies, spectrum management and allocation issues must
be addressed. On the other hand, Ronald H. Coase 1959 underlines the
importance of spectrum management by the market, with the allocation of
property rights authorizing transactions between users to improve the effi-
ciency of resource management.
While the radio-television was first removed from the sphere of commer-
cial activity, the adoption of advertising in 1968 marked a turning point for
public service broadcasting, with the use of private funds. This decision is
justified by Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas’ general policy speech
on September 16th 1969. He wanted to put the two channels in competition
in order to give better information to the public, and ensure the autonomy of
the ORTF6. Chevalier shows that this independence of television from poli-
tics is not respected in practice.
From the very beginning, the subjection of television to politics was a
structuring element of the French ecosystem. The State monopoly has thus
long maintained this political subjection, and the use of audiovisual media to
explain government policy and reach public opinion. Pierre Mende`s France,
President of the Council regularly used radio speeches with the intention of
addressing the country and gaining its trust.
A partir de 1956, les interventions gouvernementales dans ce
domaine strate´gique et ne´vralgique de l’information deviennent
pesantes et syste´matiques: des dispositifs efficaces sont mis en
place pour orienter l’information et exercer un filtrage pre´alable
de son contenu; et cette emprise ne fera que s’accentuer apre`s
1958, l’audiovisuel ”colonise´ par les gaullistes” devenant alors un
6Entity in charge of the French television
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ve´ritable instrument de propagande servant a` contrebalancer la
puissance des journaux d’opposition7 Chevalier 1990
In 1974, the break-up the the ORTF gave birth to TF1, Antenne 2 and
France 3. This change did not put an end to State control, but brought
competition to the sector. The main objective of this reform was to in-
troduce diversity and competition in the public service. This transition is
brought about by institutional mechanisms of support and mandatory orders
for broadcasters. Market organization gains ground with the opening to pri-
vate capital and the growing importance of profitability, which strengthens
the advertising market.
1.4.2 1982: the “concession-obligations” system
In 1981, political alternation opened the way to reforms and to the private
sector, while technical constraints facilitating the public monopoly are lifted
(scarcity of frequencies, high installation costs). Missika 1987 shows that
direct control of the audiovisual sector through the monopoly becomes diffi-
cult, and is then replaced by alliances with private partners.
The law of July 29th 1982 redefines the framework for audiovisual broad-
casting and abolishes the State monopoly. Its aim is to adapt the traditional
model to new technical, cultural and political developments. The opening to
the private sector goes through a heavily regulated system of public service
concessions.
In 1984, CANAL+ is the first private operator to benefit from this new
regulation. President Mitterand grants the licence to use a frequency to the
Havas group, headed by his former Chief of Staff. The case is handled directly
by the President, along with Havas, without consulting the High Authority,
inviting bids, or ministerial decisions. The same procedure applied to the
creation of the fifth and sixth channels. According to Chevalier 1990, it was
important for the government to secure support in the audiovisual sector,
while the prospect of political cohabitation was unavoidable.
7From 1956 onwards, government interventions in this strategic and sensitive field of
information became cumbersome and systematic: mechanisms were put in place to ori-
ent information and exercice prior filtering of content; this influence only increased after
1958, while the audiovisual sector, ”colonized by the Gaullists”, was used as an actual
propaganda tool to counterbalance the power of opposition newspapers. Translation by
V. Lavialle
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The 1982 law operates a specific partition of property rights and deter-
mines the firms’ assets within the ecosystem. Broadcasters obtain access
rights, or licences to broadcast, while producers gain intellectual property
rights. As for cinema, a clear timeframe of exclusive windows of broadcast-
ing, the chronology des me´dias is set. It allows each concession to be granted
exclusive distribution rights in exchange for obligatory investments. This
support system allows a dynamic production of French movies (more than
200 are produced each year), representing 35% of admissions to cinemas8.
This system, along with the growth of the television market in France,
created a positive sum game and rent-sharing between broadcasters and pro-
ducers, financing an average of 200 films per year, and ensuring that these
films have outlets.
When the game stops being positive, reform seems necessary but comes up
against obstacles. The loss of positive returns contributes to slowing down
reform processes, and to focus key players on the defense of the institution.
Indeed, D. C. North 1990 shows how institutional change can be made dif-
ficult by the loss of increasing returns. The institutional non-reversibility
is all the greater when the system is complex. In chapter 4, we show how
large production companies form a coalition to defend their rents and avoid
a renegotiation of the sharing of rights.
1.4.3 Digitization and the fall of barriers to entry
The development of private commercial channels was a first step in the trans-
formation of the audiovisual sector in France. It is followed by a second
technical step (Benghozi and Paris 2003) with digital technology.
Video on demand, satellite, digital television, and triple play offers have ex-
tended the number of access points in the market. However, the ecosystem
managed to adapt, specifically by the capture of editorial externalities be-
tween channels of incumbent operators (chapter 4).
As to cable, its development in France lagged behind other European
countries. In 1992, 1 million households were connected to the cable, com-
pared to 10 million in Germany. In the end, these new broadcasting tech-
niques were considered as an extension of Pay-TV. The consolidation of the
private sector went through digital television.
In 2005, the number of free channels goes from 5 to 18, which damages
82015 CNC
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the competitive equilibrium between broadcasters. To deal with this wave of
new entrants, incumbents adopted a consolidation strategy: TF1 takes over
NT1 and TMC, then launces HD1. M6 launches W9 and 6ter. These new
entrants are subject to similar financing obligations, which does not disrupt
the industrial organization of the sector. These developments are also ac-
companied by a different approach from broadcasters, with a segmentation
of the public by areas of interest (via thematic channels).
1.4.4 Platform entry
From 2014, with the entry of Netflix and so-called SVOD platforms, a second
wave of new entrants breaks the status quo of the ecosystem.
These platforms are online media services combining editorialization, distri-
bution and, in some cases, audiovisual content production functions. The
widespread introduction of high-speed Internet access in the 2000s allowed
for the development of these services. They allow non-linear content con-
sumption, independent of a schedule set by the broadcaster (see chapter 3).
These new players are moving away from traditional terrestrial spectrum
broadcasting networks and are not subject to regulation to the same extent
as their competitors.
These changes are forcing traditional industry players to modify their
business models (Gimpel 2015). New entrants such as Netflix are the most
prominent examples of new platforms with a different model: they offer con-
sumers an “all-you-can-watch” menu of streaming content for a fixed monthly
price. However, consumers no longer buy the content itself and can no longer
redistribute it, unlike physical CDs or DVDs. These new entrants are not
always subject to the same regulations, which were designed for different
market conditions.
These new digital platforms also significantly change the structure of the
information and advertising markets. They can closely monitor their cus-
tomers’ navigation and consumption decisions in real time. As a result, the
preferences are revealed in a much more dynamic process than they were with
over-the-air television. Depending on how the platform shares this informa-
tion with producers and advertisers, they can better target, market and price
their respective content. It also leads to companies controlling large volumes
of data (Google Facebook) having strong negotiating power in this advertis-
ing market (Gimpel 2015).
17
Appendix
27 June 1964 Creation of the Office de radiote´le´vision franc¸aise (ORTF) as a
national public service establishment.
July 3, 1972 Takeover of the ORTF after a draft liberalization in 1968 and 1969
under the Jacques Chaban-Delmas government. The national pub-
lic service broadcasting service is declared a state monopoly.
August 7, 1974 ORTF split into seven independent companies: four national com-
panies (TF1, A2, FR3, Radio-France), a public broadcasting estab-
lishment (Te´le´diffusion de France, TDF), a production company
(SFP) and a national audiovisual institute (INA). Even if it es-
tablishes the principles of competition between channels, the law
maintains the state monopoly.
November 9, 1981 Law on the granting of exemptions to the state monopoly.
29 July 1982 End of the monopoly and creation of the High Authority. It grants
operating authorizations for radio and television stations, appoints
the presidents of public channels, draws up specifications and mon-
itors competition rules.
24 December 1985 Private Television Act. The High Authority issues authorizations,
TDF keeps the broadcasting monopoly.
September 30, 1986 Freedom of Communication Act. It replaces the High Authority
with the National Commission on Communication and Freedoms
(CNCL) and ratifies the privatization of TF1.
November 28, 1986 Anti-concentration law limiting dominant positions in the audiovi-
sual and written press.
January 30, 1989 The CNCL is replaced by the Conseil supe´rieur de l’audiovisuel
(CSA).
August 4, 1989 Law on the joint presidency of A2 and FR3.
1 February 1994 New law amending the law of 30 September 1986 on freedom of
communication, which allows an operator to hold up to 49% of the
capital of a private channel.
March 21, 2000 The bill of the Minister of Culture, Catherine Trautmann, is
adopted in second reading by the National Assembly. The text,
which has been significantly amended compared with the text
adopted at first reading in May 1999, provides in particular for the
creation of a holding company bringing together the public channels
(with the exception of La Sept-Arte and Re´seau France outre-mer,
RFO), the reduction of advertising time on France 2 and France 3
and the strengthening of public sector financing. It also deals with
digital terrestrial broadcasting.
31 March 2005 Launch of the programs of the 14 free DTT channels. 30 November
2005 Presentation to the Council of Ministers of a communication
on the French international news channel (CFII) and signature on
the same day, by Dominique de Villepin, Prime Minister, of an
agreement with France Te´le´visions and TF1 allowing the creation
of the channel.
Table 1.1: Audiovisual Ecosystem Timeline (Acrimed.com, viepublique.fr)
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Chapter 2
A Multivariate Analysis of
Regulated Funding of the
French Cinema by Broadcasters
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Abstract. French television and cinema are closely linked. The cur-
rent ecosystem of production and broadcasting of audiovisual and cin-
ema works has been shaped by a regulation dating back to the 1980’s.
The right to broadcast on hertzian frequencies was granted to pub-
lic, and later on to private companies, in exchange for obligations
of investment in independent production. In compensation of these
investments, TV channels were granted broadcasting rights, but the
producer kept the ownership of other rights.
This system and the unique copyright structure it implied has allowed
the French cinema industry to thrive, but now shows its limits: au-
dience for movies on television is declining and the popularity of TV
series rises, as well as that of video-on-demand platforms which base
most of their editorialization strategy on serialized productions.
TV broadcasters currently represent over 30% of total investment in
movie production, and prime-time television is an important target for
movies. However, those movies generally aren’t financially profitable
and rely greatly on the institutional devices to go through production.
The strategic decisions of investment and broadcasting are strictly reg-
ulated within the concession-obligations system.
In this chapter, we analyze the impact of the regulation on the broad-
casters’ strategic choice of investment in movies and audiovisual pro-
ductions using a multivariate logistic model. We study a database
provided by the CNC of 22 000 orders from broadcasters to 2000 au-
diovisual producers and 1600 movies by 600 producers between 2007
and 2014. We provide evidence that, by transferring most of the
risk towards the investor, the current regulation may negatively affect
the financing diversity of the industry by creating incentives for the
broadcasters invest on the bigger producers to minimize the risk of a
financial loss.
We also show how the current regulation creates an artificial separa-
tion between the audiovisual and cinema formats, which appear to be
increasingly substitutuable from the broadcasters’ point of view.
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2.1 Introduction
The history of the French audiovisual and cinema ecosystems is one of ten-
sion between the regulation and evolution of technical constraints. The recent
developments of broadcasting techniques, allowing for entry of new players
bypassing entirely the regulation, questions its pertinence.
French television and cinema are closely linked. The current ecosystem
of production and broadcasting of audiovisual and cinema works has been
shaped by a regulation dating back to the 1980’s. The right to broadcast
on public hertzian frequencies (concessions) was granted to public, and later
on, to private companies in exchange for obligations of investment in inde-
pendent production. Broadcasters were required to invest a fixed percentage
of their turnover in French audiovisual and cinema production.
This regulation is completed by a specific copyright system: in compen-
sation for their investments, TV channels are granted broadcasting rights,
but the producer keeps the ownership of other rights. This system is insti-
tutionalized through chronological timeframes of exclusivity in broadcasting,
the chronologie des me´dias. The economic value of concessions is thus closely
linked to this of the exclusive window of broadcasting.
This organization has allowed a form of protection of domestic movies and
the French cinema industry, by restricting their exposure to foreign compe-
tition: American movies had to be sold to CANAL+, to be aired 10 month
after their release, or three year for free-to-air TV. However, the system now
shows its limits: audience for movies on television is declining, and the pop-
ularity of TV series is on the rise, as well as that of SVOD platforms which
base their editorialization strategy on serialized production. As alternative
devices grow in popularity as a means of consumption of audiovisual and
cinema works, the value of concessions and of exclusive broadcasting falls.
As the chronologie des me´dias relies on proportionality of the value of the
different timeframes relative to the obligations of investment in production,
this observation calls to a reform of the concession-obligation system, advo-
cated by several institutional reports since 2010.
In this chapter, we analyze the investment strategies of broadcasters in
both audiovisual and cinema production. We study a database provided by
the CNC of 22 000 orders from broadcasters to 2000 audiovisual producers,
and 1600 movies by 600 producers between 2007 and 2014. Using a multi-
variate probit model, we estimate the determinants of the investment choice
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and the effect of regulation on the broadcasters’ strategic decisions. We pro-
vide evidence that, by transferring most of the risk towards the investor, the
current regulation may negatively affect the financing diversity of the indus-
try, by crating incentives for the broadcasters to invest on bigger producers
to minimize the risk of a financial loss.
We also show how the current regulation creates an artificial separation be-
tween the audiovisual and cinema formats, which appear to be increasingly
substitutable from the broadcaster’s point of view.
Our analysis is similar to one conducted by Moureau, Gergaud, and Ben-
hamou 2009, which is, to our knowledge, the only empirical study concerned
with the question of the financing of cinema by television channels in France.
The authors identify the main variables influencing a broadcaster’s invest-
ment decision from the definition of a quality indicator ex ante. They con-
clude that the channel’s efforts and their choice of investment depend mostly
on the quality of the films and the nature of the co-financing. They also ob-
serve a complementarity between the funding of cinema by television chan-
nels and public support. We seek here to extend this analysis to audiovisual
financing and to shed light on the institutional and economic mechanisms
that justify broadcasters’ choice of investment. This study can then lead to
numeric applications, in order to estimate the impact of institutional changes
on the ecosystem.
2.2 Institutional framework
2.2.1 Historical context
The French audiovisual ecosystem has developed around a public model,
strictly controlled by the state since the early 1960s, and the creation of the
first public channel. Later, in 1964, a second public channel is created, along
with the ORTF, public office in charge of handling radio and television in
France and satisfying the ”needs of information, culture, education and en-
tertainment of the public”1.
After a period of State monopoly, the liberalization process took a path
of several steps, and was mostly guided by the evolution of technology and
the release of technical constraints. This process started in the 1970s, as
the ORTF was dissolved and three public channels, TF1, Antenne 2 and
France 3, were created, institutionalizing competition in the ecosystem, as a
1Law n°64-621 of 1964
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way to fight a monolithic public service. The transition is brought via in-
stitutional mechanism of obligatory funding and financial aid. The market
logic gains ground, through a greater emphasis on economic profitability for
channels, as competition reinforces the importance of the advertising market.
In the 1980s, technical constraints that legitimated the state monopoly
have become obsolete, and a political alternation opens the way to reforms.
The law of July 29, 1982 redefines the framework of the audiovisual and acts
the end of the monopoly of state. The sector is opened to private actors in a
highly regulated system of concessions-obligations, which is still used today,
and is supervised by the Haute Autorite´ de la communication audiovisuelle,
in charge of guarantying the independence of the public service and to grant
authorization of hertzian broadcasting.
This process of emancipation, reinforced by the creation of an independent
commission, the CNCL in 1986, later on replaced by the CSA (French su-
perior council of the audiovisual), is not enough to completely free the au-
diovisual sector from the political sphere. The creation of CANAL+, first
pay-TV channel was directly handled by the French President, along with the
president of the media group Havas, without consulting the High Authority,
nor call for tender.
The creation of this first pay-TV channel has been set with the goal of
developing the French cinema ecosystem, through a mechanism of obligation
of investment in cinema works. This allowed for a very dynamic production
industry, with around 200 movies produced each year, for a market share of
around 35 to 40% in movie theaters.
In the 2000s, the evolution of broadcasting technologies, allowed for a
profusion of free-to-air channels on Digital terrestrial television, leading to a
commoditization of cinema and movies. For these new entrants, broadcast-
ing a blockbuster is a guarantee of strong audience. With thousands of films
aired each year and a daily offer of around 30 movies, cinema becomes an
everyday consumer product(Olivier Bomsel 2018).
This liberalization process had direct consequences on the shape of the
ecosystem. First, private broadcasters become highly dependent on the value
of their concession of terrestrial frequencies and windows of exclusivity. This
system of protected markets and exploitation windows following a chronolog-
ical timeframe (the chronologie des me´dias) is weakened by the relaxation of
technical broadcasting constraints: it is now possible for over the top play-
ers to bypass the traditional means of distribution. Increased competition
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between channels, widespread use of the Internet via online platforms and
catch-up TV are leading to a decline in free channel advertising revenue.
The CANAL+ group, main investor in French cinema is weakened and the
terrestrial channels may lose money by broadcasting the films they have pre-
purchased (Victor Lavialle 2018, Bass 2019). Several institutional reports
(Bonnell 2013, Schwarz 2003) point to the low profitability of the sector, as
well as to inflationary pressures. This is due to an increase in the volume
of the production costs and the rigid price formation mechanism (the movie
ticket price is not a market variable). The reports also point to the fact that
French production of audiovisual works suffers from a lack of spontaneous
demand from national broadcasters. Despite the quota system and the vari-
ous regulatory funds, French production of audiovisual fiction is among the
less dynamic in Europe.
2.2.2 Details on the French regulation
The regulation associated with the licences to broadcast for French TV chan-
nels cover both obligatory investments in independent production and broad-
casting quotas, with the following objectives:
• Ensuring a strong exposure of French works,
• Strengthening the financing of creation,
• Developing a diversified network of independent production companies,
• Promoting the circulation of original French and European works
Broadcasting quotas set a certain proportion of antenna time for ”Euro-
pean works” (originating from member States of the European Union and,
under certain conditions, works from European third countries), or of ”works
of French original expression” (produced entirely or mainly in their original
version in the French language or in a regional language in use in France).
Obligations of investment in the audiovisual production are imposed on
channels that devote more than 20% of their broadcasting time to audiovisual
works, or whose turnover exceeds ¤350 millions. The obligations of invest-
ment in cinema concern channels broadcasting more than 52 unique movies,
or 104 cinema broadcasts per year. The terms and levels of these obligations
of investment vary according to various criteria, such as the broadcaster’s
turnover, its presence or not on the terrestrial network, the channel’s business
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model and the type of programs broadcast. Table 2.1 presents a simplified
representation of obligatory investments. In all cases, a minimum of 75% of
the investment must be directed to independent production2. It is possible
for free-to-air channels to reduce the amount of their obligations by investing
only in patrimonial works (choice 2)3.
Audiovisual obligations
Free-to-air channels Pay-TV channels Cinema channels/CANAL+
Choice 1 Choice 2
Independence Clause 75% of investments
AV works 15% NA 15% NA
Heritage works 10.5% 12.5% 8.5% 3.6%
Cinema obligations
Non-specialized channel Specialized channel 1st broadcast-specialized CANAL+
Independence Clause 75% of investment
European Movies 3.2% 21% 26% 12.5%
French Movies 2.5% 17% 22% 9.5%
Table 2.1: Simplified representation of obligatory investments
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Our empirical observations are based on the CNC (National Center for Cin-
ema and the Moving Image) database. The CNC is an agency of the French
Ministry of Culture, responsible for the production and promotion of cine-
matic and audiovisual works in France. It gathers a database of all orders
from broadcasters to independent producers for audiovisual works as well as
details of the cinema projects. We study a sample of 22 000 orders to 2000
audiovisual producers, 1600 movies for 600 cinema producers between 2007
and 2015.
2Article 11 of the 90-67 decree defines an independent production company as a com-
pany:
• In which the channel does not hold, directly or indirectly more than 5% of the
capital
• Who does not own, directly or indirectly more than 5% of the capital of the channel
• with which the company or service does not have links constituting a lasting com-
munity of interest
3Defined by the CNC as original audiovisual works with a heritage vocation that are
of particular cultural, social, technical, scientific or economic interest.
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Genre Pre-purchase (AV) Production cost 2007-2015 Production cost/hour Produced hours
/projects (cinema) (G¤) mean by year
Magazine 390 0.3 127 500¤ 400
Performing arts 3039 0.8 140 600¤ 700
Documentary 18561 3.5 152 500¤ 2 500
Total non-fictional 21 990 4.6 150 360 3600
Animation 523 1.7 600 000¤ 300
Fiction 2314 6.2 988 700¤ 800
Cinema 2259 11 2 782 000¤ 400
Total fictional 5096 18.9 1 414 700 1500
Table 2.2: Database description
Table 2.3 presents the detail of financing for audiovisual works and movies.
Broadcasters represent the main source of funding for most genres of audio-
visual works, and 26% of cinema funding. Most of this funding comes from
CANAL+ (20% of total cinema investment)4.
Broadcasters COSIP Producers (FR) Exports Others
Fictional Short series 65% 17% 12% 2% 4%
Works TV Series 69% 10% 11% 6% 4%
TV movies 74% 9% 9% 3% 4%
Animation 27% 16% 22% 26% 9%
Non-fictional Documentary 50% 20% 16% 5% 9%
works Magazines 68% 12% 14% 0% 5%
Performing Arts 35% 27% 28% 7% 3%
TV Subsidies Producer Exports Others
Cinema 26% 18% 25% 19% 12%
Table 2.3: Financing of French movies and audiovisual works (2007-2015)
4COSIP stands for institutional funding from the CNC. Funding from ”TV” accounts
for both investments in pre-purchase of rights and co-production
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Figure 2.1: Cinema: evolution of producer and broadcaster contributions
There is an upward trend in the share of pre-purchase contributions from
broadcasters, which exceed those of producers from 2014 onwards.
TF1 M6 France TV CANAL+
Animation 12% 6% 38% 20%
Documentary 5% 7% 29% 15%
Fiction 17% 5% 48% 11%
Magazine 1% 6% 35% 9%
Performing Arts 2% 3% 32% 3%
Cinema 8% 4% 27% 66%
Table 2.4: Frequency of investment for broadcasters
The public sector, with France Televisions participates in the financing
of a large part of the programs. The other broadcasting groups are more
specialized: CANAL+ group’s high rate of investment in animation is due
to the inclusion of specialized channels.
The cinema investments of the main broadcasters are more strongly cor-
related than for the audiovisual sector. This reflects a concentration of in-
vestments on high-budget movies, which are more likely to be profitable (V.
Lavialle and Montecino 2016).
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Cinema Audiovisual
TF1 CANAL+ M6 FTV TF1 CANAL+ M6 FTV
TF1 1 1
CANAL+ 0.1857 1 -0.0817 1
M6 -0.0179 0.1069 1 -0.0626 -0.0935 1
France TV -0.1761 0.334 -0.1029 1 -0.12 -0.1283 -0.1775 1
Table 2.5: Investment correlation matrix between groups of broadcasters
The largest audiovisual groups, on average, only marginally exceed in-
vestment requirements. This indicates that the obligations presented in the
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previous section (table 2.1) are binding, and that the actual willingness to
pay for channels is lower than their amount.
The saturation of the regulatory constraint for the major free-to-air tele-
vision groups illustrates a more fundamental problem of valuing these pro-
grams (see chapter 3). By investing, the broadcaster actually purchases an
exclusive broadcast window of the film or program. His ability to dispose
of residual rights even in the context of a co-production is extremely lim-
ited. What’s more, as suggests the model presented in the previous section,
the level of the constraint could be reducing investment on other programs.
The lack of sufficient incentives to finance programs can be explained by this,
particular copyright structure, induced by the concession-obligations system,
along with the progressive devaluation of the economic profitability of the
exclusive broadcasting window.
In is interesting to note that most of the digital terrestrial television channels
exceed their quotas on average. This could be explained by the fact that their
turnover is generally lower than bigger groups, which makes the obligation
easier to fulfill.
2.4 Determinants of broadcasters’ investment
choices
At the moment of their decision to invest, broadcasters do not know the
success of a movie, and the return-on-investment they can hope for. They
derive most of their revenues from the sale of advertising space, which is
proportional to the total audience reached. The box office success of a movie
can be a good predictor of its commercial success on Television. However,
this variable is not observable by broadcasters ex ante.
In order to solve the problem of maximization, the broadcaster must
identify a series of ex ante variables that they can use to predict the future
success of a program. In cinema, there is a significant correlation between the
production’s estimated costs and the box office entries. It can be assumed
that television channels use this amount as a proxy for future film revenue.
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Box office
(Std. Err.)
Production costs 0.015∗∗
(0.005)
Year of production 4220.923
(10315.466)
Promotional Costs 5.108∗∗
(0.297)
Table 2.6: Correlation with movie commercial success
Table 2.6 shows a positive correlation with both estimated production
costs and promotional costs and box office success of a movie. Financial
success of movies is generally considered highly unclear, and risk is a central
part of this industry. Various economic papers estimate the determinants of
box-office success and conclude to the positive effects of some variables such
as movie star notoriety or critical reviews (Elliott 2008). The main difficulty
of such an analysis is that movies are both commercial products and artistic
realizations. More precisely, they are experience goods, which quality can
only be observed after consumption. One of the first econometric studies of
the determinants of box office success, Litman 1983 conclude to a significant
effect of the presence of stars, production cost, distributor and awards. Most
studies show that elements of investment in a movie and marketing costs have
a positive effect on success: Litman and Ahn 1998, Zufryden 1996, Prag and
Casavant 1994 show that the marketing effort affects positively movie success.
From the broadcaster point of view, the investment problem amounts to
maximizing expected return on investment based on ex ante characteristics of
the movie. From the variables mentioned above, only the estimated produc-
tion costs and producer characteristics can be observed by the broadcaster
at the moment of the investment decision.
We use multivariate probit models to estimate the determinants of the
broadcaster’s choice of investment. We chose this model so as to take into
account the simultaneity of the choice from several broadcasters. Our main
variable of interest is the impact of the producer’s group on the probability
of investment.
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2.4.1 Separated analysis
In this first analysis, we assume that audiovisual programs and cinema movies
are independent goods from the broadcaster’s point of view.
The main difference between cinema and audiovisual fiction is the specific
editorial protocol of movie theaters. Development costs of a movie are near
to three times as much as a TV series (V. Lavialle and Montecino 2016),
and the film’s screening in theaters is crucial to its long term success. It also
creates a specific market, where spectators, producers and theater owners
interact.
In order to take into account characteristics of the producers, we use
producer groups generated by a classification algorithm. Using the average
yearly production cost, number of movies or audiovisual orders and average
production cost by hour for each producer, we divide producers into homo-
geneous classes. The results of this process are summarized in tables 2.7 and
2.8. The structure of both sector is similar, with a small group of leaders and
big producers with a high market share, a group of middle producers and a
large group of smaller firms with a very small production level. Details of
the methodology can be found in the appendix.
Group Number Market share Annual Years in Hours produced
prod. cost (M¤) activity (/9) (/year)
Leaders 2 13.5% 109 9 206
Big 10 14.4% 37 6.3 59
Middle 242 39.6% 5.2 4 8.6
Small 1713 30% 0.6 3 3.4
Cinema producers 140 2.5% 0.9 2 1.5
Total 2107 100 % 1.43 3 4.4
Table 2.7: Ecosystem of audiovisual production (2007-2015)
Group Number Concentration Annual Number of movies Specialization years in
(production costs) prod. cost (M¤) (yearly) (cinema) activity cinema
Leaders 4 14% 41 3 86% 9
Big 28 27% 15 2 92% 7
Middle 163 36% 9 1 96% 3
Small 468 16% 2 1 78% 2
ad hoc structures 17 7% 33 1 100% 1
Total 680 100% 4.9 1.1 83% 2
Table 2.8: Ecosystem of cinema production (2007-2015)
Results of the analysis are presented in table 2.10. Declared production
cost has a positive effect on the decision of investing for audiovisual and cin-
ema, for every broadcaster except TF1. Bigger producers benefit more from
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broadcasters’ investments in cinema.
For audiovisual works, investments are more likely to be spread out. The
fact that CANAL+ is more likely to invest in animation programs reflect
the investment of youth channels in the group. The public broadcaster has
a higher probability to invest on TV movies and on the Leading producing
firms, while TF1 seems to specialize in TV series.
As expected, a rise in the obligation level positively impacts the proba-
bility of investment. The negative coefficients associated with TF1 and M6
could be explained by the fact that the regulatory constraints are not al-
ways saturated for these groups, as well as the lack of significant changes
in the level of obligations. The effect of the different audiovisual genres on
the probability of investments illustrates horizontal differentiation between
channels.
2.4.2 Joint analysis
In this second section, we make the more realistic assumption that cinema
and audiovisual investments are substitutes from the broadcasters’ perspec-
tive. In the context of free-to-air TV, there is no fundamental difference
between a TV-movie and a cinema one: both are a 1-unit fictional program
and can be aired in similar circumstances. Thus, it seems reasonable to as-
sume that a broadcaster doesn’t make a difference between these two formats
when investing and only considers the program which will maximize his ex-
pected audience.
Because values of coefficients are not informative about the magnitude of
the effects of covariates on probabilites of success, either marginal or joint,
except for determining the signs of effects, we follow Ferrante 2008 and sum-
marize results in terms of marginal effects on success probability for each
dependent variable.
Each marginal effect represents the change in probability of success given a
one unit change in the associated regressor.
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Prob Marg CANAL + Prob Marg FTV Prob Marg TF1 Prob Marg M6
Prod. Cost 2.12E-08*** 1.30E-08*** 1.27E-08*** 6.20E-09***
Animation 0.0136 0.0589** -0.0195 0.00638
Cinema 0.369*** -0.0724*** -0.0518*** -0.0411***
Magazine -0.0658*** 0.0603*** -0.0456*** -0.00687
Series -0.164*** 0.124*** 0.127*** -0.0321**
Short series 0.0268** 0.0631*** -0.0321*** 0.0133**
Performing arts -0.11*** 0.0142 -0.0239*** -0.046***
TV movie -0.142*** 0.283*** 0.0792*** -0.0273***
Documentary ref
Ad hoc -0.204 -0.334** -0.152*** 0.298***
Middle 0.0756*** 0.0354*** -0.0108* 0.0477***
Big 0.00913 -0.0281** 0.135*** 0.0134***
Leaders 0.00376 0.107*** 0.0374*** 0.0145**
Small producers ref
Foreign coproduction 0.0431*** 0.0271*** 0.0109*** -0.054***
Ob. cinema CANAL 0.0122***
Ob. AV CANAL 0.0404***
Turnover AV CANAL -3.77E-10***
Turnover cinema CANAL -1.18E-10**
Ob. cinema FTV 0.144***
Ob. AV FTV 0.0505**
Ob. AV TF1 -0.00248***
Ob. AV M6 -0.00682***
Constant 0.589* -1.211*** 0.0749*** 0.15***
Observations 23,381 23,381 23,381 23,381
R-squared 0.966 0.998 0.949 0.907
Table 2.9: Variation of probability of investment: probit model
The coefficients presented in table 2.9 can be read as the variation in
probability of success (investment) following a marginal change in the re-
gressor variable. Results from other specifications of the probit model are
presented in the appendix.
Once again production cost is a significant factor impacting the prob-
ability of investment. We interpret this as a bet on the box-office success
of the movie, which is correlated with production cost, and one of the best
predictors of future success available ex ante to broadcasters, along with the
history of the producer.
Thus, it is not surprising that for each audiovisual group, the probability
of investment is higher if the producer is from the leaders group or from
the bigger structures than for small producers, and only the public service
broadcaster France Te´le´visions has a higher probability to invest in a project
from a small producer than a bigger one. In earlier work (V. Lavialle 2016),
we show how producers from the Big and Leaders groups are the only one
producing profitable5 movies on average, while no movie with production
cost higher than 7M¤from a small producer has been profitable6.
5Here, we define profitability of a movie as the difference between total income (box
office, broadcasting, DVD, VOD) and total production and marketing costs
6From 2007 to 2013
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Only CANAL+ is more likely to invest in Cinema than audiovisual works,
which can be explained by the higher level of obligations.
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2.5 Conclusion
The regulation and specific copyright structure of audiovisual and cinema
production in France is unique in Europe. Though always closely linked to
the political power, the evolution of the ecosystem formed by the producers,
broadcasters and the regulation evolved with technology and the release of
technical constraints set on broadcasting. After the opening to competition
and the end of the State monopoly, the concession-obligations system ensured
the funding and dynamism of the French production. The recent evolution in
broadcasting technology, allowing to bypass the traditional hertzian or dig-
ital networks strongly impacts the strategies of investment of TV channels.
The value of the temporal exclusivity in broadcasting decreases in front of
the rise in popularity of TV series and online video-on-demand platforms.
We provide evidence to how the regulation may now negatively affect the
diversity of production, as the channels are more likely to invest on projects
from the bigger producers, in order to minimize the risk. What’s more, it is
possible that popular formats such as TV series are financed in a sub-optimal
manner by broadcasters, as the structure of copyright distorts the financing
decisions towards content providing a better live audience.
For further research, estimating or simulating the actual willingness to
invest of broadcasters could give a better understanding of the effects of
regulation on the decisions to invest. A specific study on the degree of sub-
stituability of audiovisual works and cinema from the channels point of view
could also provide insight on the effects of the separated obligations for cin-
ema and audiovisual works.
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2.6 Appendix
Regresions are run at the group level for broadcasters, and not channel level.
This is due to the fact most of the obligations of investment apply at group
level.
Audiovisual groups in the database:
1. CANAL+ Group : CANAL+, Come´die+ , Piwi+, Planete+, Tele-
toon+
2. France Te´le´visions Group : France 2, France 3, France 4, France 5,
TV5
3. TF1 Group : TF1, HD1, NT1, TMC
4. M6 Group : M6, W9, Paris Premie`re, TEVA, Se´rie Club, 6ter
5. Lagarde`re Group : Canal J, Gulli, Tiji
6. NRJ Group : Nrj, Che´rie HD
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2.6.1 Regression Tables
CANAL+ France TV TF1 M6
Production cost 9.57e-08∗∗∗ 3.85e-08∗∗∗ 5.07e-08∗∗∗ 4.24e-08∗∗∗
Animation 0.0259 0.149∗∗ -0.105 0.118
Cinema 1.088∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗
Magazine -0.396∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ -0.840∗∗∗ -0.0584
TV series -0.926∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗
Short series 0.127∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗
Spectacle vivant -0.915∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗
TV movie -0.907∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗
Ad Hoc structure -0.780 -1.081∗∗ -0.438 1.136∗∗∗
Middle 0.396∗∗∗ 0.0886∗∗∗ -0.0732∗ 0.478∗∗∗
Big prod. 0.0207 -0.0934∗∗ 0.766∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
Leaders -0.0360 0.283∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗
Foreign Coproduction 0.200∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗
Ob. cinema Canal
Ob. AV Canal
Ob. cinema FTV
Ob. AV FTV
Ob. AV TF1
Ob. AV M6
Number of movies
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ AV)
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ cine)
Intercept -1.478∗∗∗ -0.629∗∗∗ -1.743∗∗∗ -1.773∗∗∗
Observations 23,381 23,381 23,381 23,381
Table 2.11: Additional Regression (1)
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CANAL+ France TV TF1 M6
Production cost 9.58e-08*** 3.80e-08*** 5.01e-08*** 4.22e-08***
Animation 0.0242 0.154** -0.0898 0.131
Cinema 1.087*** -0.226*** -0.255*** -0.390***
Magazine -0.411*** 0.172** -0.827*** -0.0261
TV series -0.933*** 0.319*** 0.490*** -0.217**
Short series 0.122** 0.178*** -0.285*** 0.164**
Spectacle vivant -0.906*** 0.0397 -0.361*** -0.459***
TV movie -0.920*** 0.734*** 0.419*** -0.251***
Ad Hoc structure -0.807 -1.020** -0.416 1.188***
Middle 0.393*** 0.108*** -0.0709* 0.483***
Big prod. 0.0174 -0.0784** 0.765*** 0.212***
Leaders -0.0417 0.296*** 0.352*** 0.187**
Foreign Coproduction 0.195*** 0.0776*** 0.112*** -0.619***
Ob. cinema Canal 0.0504***
Ob. AV Canal -0.254***
Ob. cinema FTV 1.461***
Ob. AV FTV 0.308***
Ob. AV TF1 0.0222
Ob. AV M6 0.0128
Number of movies -0.000329*** -0.000525*** 0.000204*** 0.000243***
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ AV)
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ cine)
Intercept -0.0637 -10.06*** -2.651*** -2.705***
Observations 23,381 23,381 23,381 23,381
Table 2.12: Additional Regression (3)
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CANAL+ France TV TF1 M6
Production cost 9.58e-08*** 3.80e-08*** 5.01e-08*** 4.22e-08***
Animation 0.0254 0.153** -0.0898 0.131
Cinema 1.086*** -0.226*** -0.255*** -0.391***
Magazine -0.409*** 0.172** -0.827*** -0.0262
TV series -0.935*** 0.319*** 0.490*** -0.217**
Short series 0.120** 0.178*** -0.285*** 0.163**
Spectacle vivant -0.905*** 0.0397 -0.361*** -0.459***
TV movie -0.918*** 0.734*** 0.419*** -0.251***
Ad Hoc structure -0.812 -1.020** -0.416 1.188***
Middle 0.394*** 0.108*** -0.0710* 0.483***
Big prod. 0.0191 -0.0785** 0.765*** 0.211***
Leaders -0.0402 0.296*** 0.352*** 0.187**
Foreign Coproduction 0.194*** 0.0776*** 0.112*** -0.619***
Ob. cinema Canal 0.0646***
Ob. AV Canal
Ob. cinema FTV 1.478***
Ob. AV FTV 0.307***
Ob. AV TF1 0.0205
Ob. AV M6 0.0120
Number of movies -0.000248*** -0.000528*** 0.000199*** 0.000242***
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ AV)
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ cine)
Intercept -1.516*** -10.09*** -2.615*** -2.688***
Observations 23,381 23,381 23,381 23,381
Table 2.13: Additional Regression (4)
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CANAL+ France TV TF1 M6
Production cost 9.60e-08*** 3.79e-08*** 5.05e-08*** 4.20e-08***
Animation 0.0221 0.158** -0.0976 0.123
Cinema 1.086*** -0.224*** -0.260*** -0.395***
Magazine -0.411*** 0.172** -0.836*** -0.0415
TV series -0.931*** 0.321*** 0.483*** -0.225**
Short series 0.121** 0.178*** -0.287*** 0.155**
Spectacle vivant -0.905*** 0.0408 -0.356*** -0.451***
TV movie -0.922*** 0.738*** 0.410*** -0.259***
Ad Hoc structure -0.825 -1.025** -0.427 1.178***
Middle 0.390*** 0.104*** -0.0741* 0.478***
Big prod. 0.0137 -0.0825** 0.761*** 0.207***
Leaders -0.0446 0.296*** 0.349*** 0.183**
Foreign Coproduction 0.196*** 0.0773*** 0.109*** -0.623***
Ob. cinema Canal 0.0665***
Ob. AV Canal 0.239***
Ob. cinema FTV 0.454***
Ob. AV FTV 0.144***
Ob. AV TF1 -0.0240**
Ob. AV M6 -0.0619***
Number of movies
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ AV) -2.08e-09***
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ cine) -5.68e-10**
Intercept 1.212* -4.990*** -1.425*** -0.832***
Observations 23,381 23,381 23,381 23,381
Table 2.14: Additional Regression (5)
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CANAL+ France TV TF1 M6
Production cost 9.59e-08*** 3.80e-08*** 5.01e-08*** 4.21e-08***
Animation 0.0223 0.154** -0.0898 0.131
Cinema 1.086*** -0.226*** -0.255*** -0.390***
Magazine -0.412*** 0.172** -0.827*** -0.0261
TV series -0.931*** 0.319*** 0.490*** -0.216**
Short series 0.121** 0.178*** -0.284*** 0.164**
Performing Arts -0.905*** 0.0398 -0.361*** -0.459***
TV movie -0.922*** 0.734*** 0.419*** -0.251***
Ad Hoc structure -0.824 -1.021** -0.416 1.189***
Middle 0.390*** 0.108*** -0.0709* 0.483***
Big prod. 0.0139 -0.0785** 0.765*** 0.212***
Leaders -0.0450 0.296*** 0.352*** 0.187**
Foreign Coproduction 0.195*** 0.0776*** 0.112*** -0.619***
Ob. cinema Canal 0.0691***
Ob. AV Canal 0.233
Ob. cinema FTV 1.440***
Ob. AV FTV 0.305***
Ob. AV TF1 0.0219
Ob. AV M6 0.0123
Number of movies 0 -0.000517*** 0.000203*** 0.000243***
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ AV) -2.07e-09***
Taxable Turnover (CANAL+ cine) -5.58e-10
Intercept 1.221 -9.968*** -2.645*** -2.695***
Observations 23,381 23,381 23,381 23,381
Table 2.15: Additional Regression (6)
2.6.2 Details of the classification protocol
We use an upward clustering algorithm to generate homogeneous groups of
producers from the CNC database. More theoretic details can be found in
section 4.5.2.
First, the variables of interest used to classify producers are determined.
This selection is made by means of a main component analysis on the cen-
tred and reduced variables. This treatment also operates a reduction of the
dimensionality of the problem, which allows for better computation (see sec-
tion 4.5.2). We choose to keep four components, presented in table 2.16.
Table 2.17 gives the position of the variables used to create the axes of each
of those axes.
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Axis Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Axis 1 2.02 .95 0.50 0.50
Axis 2 1.07 .21 0.27 0.77
Axis 3 .86 .79 0.21 0.99
Axis 4 .056 . 0.01 1.0000
Table 2.16: Principal Components Analysis
Variable Axe 1 Axe 2 Axe 3 Axe 4
Devis total 0.67 0.15 -0.22 0.69
Devis/Anne´es 0.69 0.08 -0.10 -0.71
Devis horaire 0.27 -0.55 0.79 0.10
Spe´cialisation AV -0.01 0.82 0.57 0.01
Table 2.17: PCA: Principal Components
We define a producer P by its coordinates in the plan formed by the four
principal axes:
P = (x, y, z, t) ∈ P (2.1)
We can then generate the hierarchy H, illustrated in the dendogram in
figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Dendogram of the classification algorithm
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In order to determine the number of classes to be kept, we refer to the
Calinski criterion (table 2.18, Calin´ski and Harabasz 1974) of the Pseudo-F.
It corresponds to a division of the intra-group variance by the number of
groups. Thus, the higher the value of the index, the better the cut. Sec-
ondly, we use the Duda criterion (table 2.19, Richard O. Duda 2000), given
at each step by the ratio between the sum of the standard deviations of the
group to be divided, Je(1) and the sum of the standard deviations of the
two subgroups resulting from the division, Je(2). A high value of this index
indicates a distinct structure: the higher the Je(1)/Je(2) index, the better
the cut. The Duda-Hart criterion requires a hierarchical classification: at
each level of the hierarchy, it must be possible to indicate which group is to
be divided.
Figure 2.3: Criteria for the choice of the number of classes
Figure 2.3 shows an illustration of the evolution of the two indexes con-
sidered. Duda’s index is on the left axis, and Calinski’s on the right. As the
purpose of the classification is to synthesize information available on pro-
ducers, a smaller number of classes will be preferred. The peak of the two
indexes between 5 and 6 classes leads us to choose five classes for the analysis.
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Number of classes Pseudo-F, Calinski/Harabasz
2 1157.93
3 1716.72
4 2185.11
5 2929.88
6 2764.49
7 2730.07
8 2837.08
9 3070.71
10 3447.91
11 3554.18
12 3530.99
13 3540.21
14 3588.91
15 3690.98
Table 2.18: Calinski index
— Number of classes Je(2)/Je(1) Pseudo-T-squared
1 0.6334 1157.93
2 0.5797 1449.58
3 0.5977 271.26
4 0.4668 287.80
5 0.4384 190.86
6 0.6702 118.11
7 0.4556 1904.89
8 0.3148 21.76
9 0.4258 148.36
10 0.5199 136.69
11 0.5541 1176.53
12 0.4383 114.07
13 0.4226 181.70
14 0.6218 77.85
15 0.5115 8.59
Table 2.19: Duda/Hart criterium
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Chapter 3
Rational Addiction to
Audiovisual Narratives: an
Analysis of Broadcasting and
Consumption of Fiction in
France
Abstract. TV-series have traditionally been watched and monetized
through broadcasting on free-to-air and pay television. They are in-
creasingly consumed via on-demand platforms and catch-up services.
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate how the narrative structure
of TV-series influences their consumption and causes delinearization.
We use data from Me´diame´trie, reporting the live and catch-up au-
dience for all movies and series aired between 8 p.m and 10 p.m on
free and public French TV-channels, from 2011 to 2016. We show
that when the story takes several episodes or seasons to develop, con-
sumers are more likely to watch the program on alternative platforms
or catch-up. We provide evidence that the consumption of such pro-
grams follows a model of rational addiction, where current consump-
tion is influenced by its past and future values.
These results allow us to explain recent changes in the industrial orga-
nization of the French free-to-air television market. We show how the
narrative structure of TV-series can explain broadcasters’ competitive
strategies. These results can have important policy implications, as
broadcasters are one of the main investors in the production of audio-
visual content in France.
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3.1 Introduction
For a long time, television was the only way to access domestic audiovi-
sual content. TV programs synchronized society around major events of the
present, such as the newscast or sports. It created habits, and organized the
time of the viewer with a combination of stories to the present (news, games,
sports) and to the past (fiction).
The generalization of broadcasting on the Internet, via catch-up services,
or dedicated platforms disrupts the classical model of television, which is
no longer delegated the organization of the evening. These evolutions in
broadcasting technology follow the video cassette recorder and the DVD,
and loosens the constraint of the TV schedule, by allowing a non-linear1 con-
sumption of audiovisual content. This has an impact on screenwriting and
narratives. TV series constitute a strong example of this change in paradigm:
non-linear broadcasting allows screenwriters to develop the story over several
episodes without using tricks such as a summary of recent events at the be-
ginning of each episode. More intensive watching of the program also makes
the spectator more likely to identify inconsistencies in the script, which in-
centivizes coherent narrative over a whole season. In the end, the new modes
of consuming TV series change narrative writing and give rise to new formats
of TV series.
We claim that new forms of narrative writing and broadcasting changes
the demand and utility functions for TV series. This underlies a transition
from a synchronized audiovisual consumption (the collective habit created by
linear television) towards on demand consumption. Such non-linear watching
patterns can lead to addictive effects, as illustrated by the emergence of binge-
watching2 with the rise of online media services.
This phenomenon has industrial and policy implications, as the evolu-
tion of TV series and their narrative leads to changes in the broadcasting
strategies of channels. Free-to-air TV must face the competition of new
players, using series as the center of a commercial strategy focused on these
new modes of non-linear consumption. The first response of free-to-air broad-
1In the model of traditional linear television programming, the broadcaster selects a
schedule of shows that can only be viewed at a set time. The viewer cannot interact in
any way with the programming. By opposition, non-linear television can be considered
to be any method or technology that allows viewers to select what shows they watch and
when they watch them.
2Binge-watching is the practice of watching television for a long time span, usually a
single television show.
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casters against this new competition is the creation of catch-up services, such
as MyTF1 or M6replay in France, but the traditional model of television has
a hard time valuing non-direct audience.
In this chapter, we estimate the economic effects of these new modes of
consuming TV series, and their impact on the French broadcasting industry.
We provide evidence as to how the changes in narrative writing led to a shift
in the demand function for TV series. To this effect, we use the rational
addiction framework3 to characterize the consumption of series. We show
how the narrative structure of fiction programs is key in explaining non-
linear demand. The chapter is based on aggregate audience data of fiction
programs aired between 8 and 10 p.m. on free-to-air television from 2011 to
2016.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 2 presents the related lit-
erature on the consumption of cultural goods, and specifically audiovisual
fiction, as well as the economic effects of the narrative structure of these pro-
grams. In section 3, we draw an analysis of the market for broadcasting of
fiction in France, highlighting the possible effects of narrative on the strate-
gies of agents. Section 4 consists of the study of the link between narrative
structure and delinearization of consumption. Finally, we estimate a rational
addiction model to explain this link. We propose an application of this idea
by modeling audience using ARIMA processes.
3.2 Economic effects of narrative: habits and
addiction
3.2.1 TV series viewing in social sciences’ literature
There are two main modes of viewing TV series. The first one relies on the
schedule set by broadcasters. This is the principle of television appointments:
episodes from the series are aired at fixed times by the TV channel, and make
up appointments for the spectator.
The second mode of consuming audiovisual content has been made possible
by the invention of the VCR, the DVD, and more recently by the generaliza-
tion of video-on-demand and the editorial strategies of online-based broad-
casters. The viewing of an episode from a series is not linked to a specific
3We say a good is addictive if and only if an increase in past consumption leads to an
increase in current consumption holding current prices and the marginal utility of wealth
fixed. This definition is from Becker, 1988, G. Becker and K. Murphy 1988
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time or day, but at the spectator’s convenience. Various sociological studies4
suggest that this second mode of viewing generally leads to consuming more
episodes at once, in a short time period, a behaviour often refered to as binge-
watching. The viewer, rather than making pauses between each episode, may
chose to watch for many hours in one session, at the detriment of other ac-
tivities. To be able to consume an additional episode immediately, he may
accept to degrade his future utility. Mikos 2016 defines binge watching as
a metaphor describing a form of intensive consumption of television series.
According to him, complex narrative structures reinforce this phenomenon.
He claims that:
Complex narrative structures reinforce the distinction since view-
ers can immerse themselves more deeply in the fictional worlds
and so experience the “complex pleasures of narrative”, in which
one is caught in the contradictory desire to find out what happens
next and for the story not to end (Mikos 2016)
This quote highlights that behaviours such as binge-watching are induced
or reinforced by narrative writing. As we stated, the evolution of broadcast-
ing technologies allows screenwriters to develop more complex narratives,
over a complete season. Such TV series narrative might give rise to addictive
effects. Kranz 2015 shows that the identification with the main characters
of a series is one of the most powerful vectors of intensive watching. This
identification, made possible by the evolution of characters is notably absent
from other narrative formats (for instance movies), making these effects spe-
cific to TV series. This dichotomy between different modes of viewing TV
series translates into economics as different utility functions associated with
different programs.
From the consumer’s point of view, the opposition between linear and non-
linear watching translates more into rationed and all you can watch consump-
tion. The constraint of the television schedule imposes a specific pattern of
consumption and can prevent addictive effects from developing.
This evolution of viewing and emergence of new modes of consumption
has direct applications to the broadcasting industry and TV series market-
ing. Some broadcasters have been able to identify the binge watching phe-
nomenon and applied it as part of their editorial strategy. The marketing for
La Vengeance aux Yeux Clairs5 by TF1 takes advantage of this specificity of
4See Combes 2015, Kranz 2015
5French TV series aired from September 8th 2016 on TF1. Produced by J-L Azoulay
and JLA Productions
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consumption by making the entire season available on demand after the live
broadcast of the first episode.
While non-linear consumption emancipates the spectator from the TV
schedule, it’s important to note that some phenomena can still lead to a
relative synchronization in viewings. For instance, the common term spoiler
refers to the act of revealing a key element of the plot of an episode to some-
one who has not seen it yet. The utility of watching a spoilt episode is thus
considerably lower. This effect can be linked to network externalities, as the
probability of the spoiler occurring increases with the number of viewers. It
affects the consumer by increasing his rate of preference for the present: the
expected utility of watching the episode at some future point in time has to
be discounted by the probability of a spoiler occurring.
The importance of such peer effects in the emergence of addiction is well
known in the literature of rational addiction, and is explained for instance in
Laux 1999 for the case of tobacco consumption.
Many econometric studies investigate the consumption of cultural goods6,
or apply the theoretical framework of rational addiction to goods such as
drugs, cigarettes or alcohol7. On the other hand, very few articles focus
on the addictive effects of cultural goods. Cameron 1999 studies this phe-
nomenon in the case of cinema demand. His results fail to support the
presence of rational addiction. Yet, Castiglione and Infante 2015 demon-
strate that some addictive effect exists in the demand for theatre in Italy. To
the best of our knowledge, this chapter carries out the first analysis of TV
series consumption based on rational addiction, and provides new evidence
allowing a better understanding of non linear forms of consumption.
To identify the economic effects of the narrative structure in TV series,
we use a typology distinguishing series with independent episodes and series
where the narrative builds up during several episodes (serials)8. The series
with independent episodes, or recurring characters is a format linked to tra-
ditional television. The continuity is ensured by the persistence of the main
characters (e.g. TV shows such as Friends or The Simpsons). In that sense,
such programs are close to the franchises of cinema (James Bond, Sherlock
6see for instance Borgonovi 2004, Ateca-Amestoy, Serrano-del-Rosal, and Vera-Toscano
2008, Werck, Heyndels, and Geys 2007, Zieba 2009
7See Chaloupka 1991, G. Becker, Grossman, and K. Murphy 1994 , Bask and Melkers-
son 2004
8Details on this typology can be found on table 3.9
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Holmes, etc.). We say a series has independent episodes9 if and only if those
episodes can be followed in any order without significant loss of utility.
By opposition, serials create an attachment, not only to recurring charac-
ters, but also to the narrative itself, broken over several episodes or seasons.
Episodes are interdependent and narrative develops slowly (e.g. Game of
Thrones, House of Cards). We allege that this continuity of narration gives
rise to addiction effects that are unique to this format, and, by construction,
weak or non-existent for independent series. It is important to note that this
typology is simple and corresponds to ideal-type cases. While a continuum
exists between series with completely independent episodes and ones where
a story is broken over strongly linked episodes, such a rough distinction is
necessary to our economic and statistical analysis. The typology originates
from genre description in the database, completed by the analysis of synopsis
for each individual series.
3.2.2 Preferences and cultural goods: a theoretical frame-
work
Several theories of preference formation for cultural goods account for the
importance of experience in explaining demand. First, a theory of habit
formation was applied by Houthakker 1970 in the estimation of the demand
for cultural goods in the United States. This form of preference modeling
assumes that the utility derived from the consumption of a good depends on
past consumption via a habit variable:
U = u(ct, ht) (3.1)
ht = f(ct−1) (3.2)
A second way of modeling consumption of cultural goods is to assume
consumers are uncertain about the quality of goods, and update their prefer-
ences in response to their experience. In Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette
1996, consumers discover their preferences through this sequential process.
The taste for experience goods increases with consumption and stabilizes af-
ter some time.
The contribution of the theory of rational addiction, developed by G.
Becker and K. Murphy 1988, is the introduction of a fundamental distinc-
tion between habits and addictions, based on two key variables: the utility of
9Later referred to as independent series
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adjacent consumption and the discount rate. This also allows to takes into
account expectations about the future, as the consumption of an episode
from a TV series depends on the anticipation of being able to watch the
entire season, or several seasons, which is not modeled in previous theories.
We develop an application of the rational addiction model to television
series. We assume viewers are rational agents, and behave in a way that
maximizes their inter-temporal utility under budget constraint10. They have
limited time and resources to establish their current and future levels of con-
sumption.
Let u be the utility of the viewer, so that:
U(ct) = f(ct, St) (3.3)
It is assumed that U is a concave function. S stands for the stock past
consumption of c. The utility from watching any given episode depends on
the value of the episode as well as the amount and timing of watching the
previous episodes. We assume that the consumer doesn’t chose the order in
which he sees the episodes and watches them in order.
The stock of past consumption depreciates with time such as:
∂S(t)
∂t
< 0 (3.4)
This stands for the consumer’s progressively forgetting the past develop-
ments of the narrative.
S˙(t) = c(t)− δS(t) (3.5)
We define an habitual good such as an increase in consumption at time t
causes a raise of future consumption.
∂c(t)
∂S(t) > 0 (3.6)
With a level of consumption c such that c ≤ δS, the evolution of the
stock S converges (equation 3.5) and there is a steady-state equilibrium in
the long run.
We define an addictive good such that:
10As we deal with free-to-air television, the budget constraint should be understood as
a limited free-time constraint
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∂c(t)
∂S(t) > δ (3.7)
In that case, the evolution of the stock of consumption will diverge and
lead to an ever-growing consumption, given that c(0) > 0.
Following Becker and Murphy, we note the inter-temporal utility of a
consumer with length of life T such as:
U0 =
∫ T
0
e−σtu[y(t), c(t), S(t)]dt (3.8)
The consumer’s maximization program can be written as:
max
c(t),y(t)
U0 =
∫ T
0
e−σtu[y(t), c(t), S(t)]dt (3.9)
s.t.
∫ T
0
e−rt[y(t) + c(t)]dt ≤ A0 +
∫ T
0
e−rtω(t)dt (3.10)
Where sigma stands for the preference for the present, A0 the initial value
of assets, r the interest rate, constant over time and ω(t) the earnings at time
t.
In the case of strictly addictive goods, G. Becker and K. Murphy show
that only two stationary states can exist, one stable (total abstinence), and
the other one unstable. In the second one, consumption continues to in-
crease even if the viewer is aware of possible harmful effects on its future
utility (binge watching). We tend towards a bi-modal consumption: quasi-
abstinence or excessive consumption.
This framework identifies two key variables of addiction. First, the ad-
dictiveness, ∂c(t)
∂S(t) is linked to the growing utility of the narrative, and can
be stronger as the story crosses several intrigues, and uses devices such as
cliffhangers11. Thus, narrative writing can be aimed at generating addiction.
The particularity of TV-series relatively to other addictive goods is the
importance of novelty. The series can only be addictive as long as the story
evolves from an episode to the next one and new seasons are produced. The
addictive behaviors are limited by the number of available episodes, and to-
tal abstinence is imposed at the end of the season or series. It is important
11A cliffhanger is a plot device in fiction which features a main character in a precarious
or difficult dilemma, or confronted with a shocking revelation at the end of an episode of
serialized fiction. A cliffhanger is hoped to ensure the audience will return to see how the
characters resolve the situation.
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to note that the rate of depreciation of the capital S(t) is an incentive for
the producer to minimize the time between two seasons of a series, in order
to benefit from addictive effects. On the other hand, he has incentives to
wait and observe the success of a first season before choosing to invest in an
additional one. The time period between two seasons of a serial is also an
opportunity for producers and broadcasters to offer substitutes, in order to
keep the audience captive. This explains the growing importance of recom-
mendation algorithms on online platforms.
The discount rate, σ is the other key variable in explaining addiction, as
the higher it is, the more likely the consumer is to get addicted. Younger
consumers are thought to have a higher discount rate, leading to a short-term
preference. The risk of spoilers, linked to network effects leads to an increase
in σ.
3.3 Competition for broadcasting of fiction
on the free-to-air television market
We claim that the specifics of TV series narrative, and the difference in
demand function for linear and non-linear watching can help understand the
industrial organization of the French market for fiction broadcasting.
We use audience data from Me´diame´trie. The database covers every fictional
program aired between 8:30 p.m. and 10 p.m. (prime time) on French free-
to-air channels from 2011 to 2016. More details about the dataset can be
found in table 3.8 in the appendix. The audience is estimated using surveys
on a representative sample of the French population.
3.3.1 Demand for TV programs: the audience scatters
The market for free-to-air broadcasting during prime-time in France is shared
between public channels (France Te´le´visions), free hertzian private channels
(TF1, M6) and TNT channels. Their main source of revenue comes from the
sale of advertising space, the price of which is proportional to the audience.
Public channels don’t broadcast advertising during the time slots we study.
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Figure 3.1: Average audience for fiction programs (thousands)
The average time spent watching television remains stable in France,
around 3 hours and 41 minutes12. This average rises to 5 hours for those
over 50, and is the lowest among young people.
The average audience for a fictional program decreased by almost 40% be-
tween 2011 and 2016. This fragmentation of demand is partly due to the
entry of new TNT channels, such as HD1, Nume´ro 23, RMC De´couverte,
Che´rie 25, available in December 2012.
Figure 3.2: Average audience for fiction programs for each channel (thou-
sands)
This downward trend impacts mostly the private channels M6 and TF1.
The average audience of France Te´le´visions, the public service broadcaster,
12Me´diame´trie
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is maintained, and that of the TNT channels is increasing, though still low.
Figure 3.3: Audience for TV series (mean)
Contrary to the general trend, the demand for serials is holding still (see
figure 3.3). This effect may reflect unobserved characteristics of these pro-
grams. Indeed, as the development of such programs has accompanied the
evolution of broadcasting technology, notably allowing for non-linear con-
sumption, these series could be on average more recent, and potentially more
popular. We do not have the data necessary to control such effects. The ini-
tial peek in figure 3.3 can be explained by lack of data in the first months of
2011.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of TV series broadcasting
The growth in the broadcasting of series is similar for both narrative
formats (independent and serials). We can deduce an increase in demand for
serials from the maintaining of the average audience despite an increase in
the number of episodes aired (figures 3.3 and 3.4).
3.3.2 Strategies and competition for the broadcasting
of fiction
The volume of fiction programs aired on French television doubled between
2011 and 2016. This evolution can be explained in part by the entry of
channels HD1, 6ter, Nume´ro 23, RMC De´couverte and Che´rie 25. This
volume also increased within various broadcasting groups.
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Figure 3.5: Total hours of fiction aired on free-TV
The strategic choice of programs does not necessarily correspond to the
changes in demand highlighted in the previous section. While the demand
for serials seems to be increasing, free-to-air channels tend to chose more
movies since 2016.
After a transition towards serials, TF1 chooses movies as their main format
for 2016 (figure 3.6). The same transition can be observed on the TF1 group’s
TNT channels.
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Figure 3.6: Program choice for TF1
M6 adopts a similar strategy, but focuses on independent-episodes series.
The share of serials increases between 2012 and 2015 then drops in favor of
movies.
Figure 3.7: Program choice for M6
This strategic choice can be explained by the effects of the narrative struc-
ture on demand. Because of its potentially addictive nature, the serial can
be seen as a way to retain audience. This idea is illustrated in figure 3.4:
serials are the only format that keeps a stable audience. However, the addic-
tive effets of such programs, inducing behaviors like binge-watching leads to
a delinearization of consumption. There is a strong correlation between the
broadcasting of these series and catch-up audience (figure 3.8). The switch
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towards movies in 2016 is explained by the difficulty for free-to-air channels
to make sufficient profit on their catch-up platforms. It is interesting to re-
mark that serialized series make up the majority of catch-up audience (figure
3.9).
Figure 3.8: Live audience and share of serials in broadcasting (TF1)
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Figure 3.9: Catch-up audience (thousands)
The distribution of the channel’s broadcasting time between the various
narrative formats constitutes an axis of horizontal differentiation. Figure
3.10 shows a certain uniformity in the choices of main TV channels. We
can see consolidation strategies of the groups with their TNT channels, di-
versifying the programs chosen, in order to attract consumers with different
preferences. We can interpret the void in the bottom left corner of figure
3.10, as corresponding to the positioning of pay-TV and VOD-platforms.
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Figure 3.10: Channel differentiation by program type (2016)
3.4 The effect of narrative format on the de-
mand for TV series
We now test the predictions from the model presented in the previous sec-
tions. First, we try to establish a causal link between the narrative format of
TV series (independent or serialized), and the mode of consumption (linear
or non-linear). In order to explain this effect, we estimate several models for
demand, taking into account the possible addictive effects for serials. First,
we use an Arellano-Bond (Arellano and Bond 1991) generalized moments
method to estimate a rational addiction. We then present a case study using
SARIMA processes.
3.4.1 Serials induce non-linear consumption
Editorial strategies aimed at non-linear viewing and the entry of online plat-
forms have led to a change in the series’ mode of consumption. The last
decade has also been marked by illegal downloading (since 2012, every year,
Game of Thrones is the most pirated series in the world, with an average
of 14.4 milion downloads per episode13). These two factors contributed to
move TV series away from the television screen, towards computers, tablets,
mobiles or alternative devices. This induces a new way to appreciate the
13Source: Torrentfreak.com
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narrative, that we try to evaluate.
The non-linear broadcasting strategies of free-to-air TV channels are
based on the development of catch-up platforms:MyTF1, 6play, M6replay
or Pluzz (France Te´le´visions). These allow delayed watching of programs for
a period of 7 days.
For most channels, we report a negative correlation between the share of
serials in the programmation and the share of live audience. This effect is
especially strong for TF1 (−0.98) and Arte (−0.83).
We estimate the causal effect of the series’ narrative structure on the
share of live audience. We estimate a linear model, specified by equation
3.11. We use robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity in the
data. Results of the estimation are reported in table 3.1.
Plive = α ∗ 1Serial + β ∗ t+ γ ∗ A+
∑
i
δi ∗ X + C + ε (3.11)
With Plive the share of live audience in total (live + catch-up) audience, t
a time variable, A total audience, ans X a vector of control variables, C ∈ R
and ε an error term. We control for several important effects. First, to
account for evolution of technologies, we include a control for the year and
the channel (as some channel may have better performing replay services).
The month and day dummies control for the potential effect of the time
of the broadcast. Finally, we control for the total volume of audience and
the country of origin of the program. The model is estimated on 21 808
observations.
63
Table 3.1: Estimation results with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard er-
rors
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Total audience 0.00∗∗ (0.00)
Year -0.47∗∗ (0.02)
TF1 (base) 0.00 (0.00)
France 2 -2.6∗∗ (0.17)
HD1 1.5∗∗ (0.24)
M6 0.32∗ (0.13)
NRJ12 2.9∗∗ (0.23)
TMC 2.7∗∗ (0.21)
W9 2.9∗∗ (0.20)
Serialized -4.81∗∗ (0.11)
USA -2.4∗∗ (0.07)
France (base) 0.00 (0.00)
UK -3∗∗ (0.25)
Sweden -4.6∗∗ (0.74)
The results presented in Table 3.1 confirm that choosing to air a serial
instead of a series with independent episodes leads viewers to switch towards
catch-up. We estimate that ceteris paribus, choosing to air a serial rather
than a series with independent episodes will lead to a transfer of 4.8% of the
audience towards catch-up.
The trend of growing non-linear consumption can be explained by the tech-
nical progress of digital catch-up platforms. We interpret channel-specific
effects as the performance, or the existence of a catch-up platform. We also
remark a significant effect of the country of origin upon the mode of consump-
tion: American, British or Swedish series are more likely to be consumed on
demand that French series. It’s possible that this effect actually captures the
effect of popularity or quality of the series, which we do not measure.
3.4.2 Model of rational addiction
Empirical strategy
As detailed in the previous sections, our analysis is that this de-linearization
of viewings induced by the narrative forms of serials can be explained by
a model of rational addiction. In this section, we seek to prove that con-
sumption of TV series on French free-to-air channels follows such a model.
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Specifically, we will determine whether current consumption can be explained
by the past and anticipations of future consumption.
As presented in the theoretical framework section, if individuals are ra-
tional and the TV series is an addictive good, past and future consumption
should have a positive impact on current consumption. From this framework,
we derive the following model:
Ci,t = β1Ci,t−1 + β2Ci,t+1 + β3Xi,t + αi + εit (3.12)
With C the consumption of TV series, t the episode and i the series. X
stands for a vector of exogenous variables. We control for the country of
origin, the TV channel which aired the series, date, advertising time during
the broadcast, and the evaluation of viewers for the whole series14. αi stands
for fixed effects and ε the error term. We say a good is addictive or habitual
when β1 > 0, and the degree of addiction increases with β1.
As detailed previously, numerous articles applied the rational addiction
framework to explain consumption of such addictive goods as cigarettes (G.
Becker, Grossman, and K. Murphy 1994), gambling ( Farrell, Morgenroth,
and Walker 1999) or cultural goods (Yamamura 2009). The estimation of
such models has to deal with the endogeneity of past and future consump-
tion.
To deal with this bias, we reproduce here the approach of Castiglione and
Infante 2015 for the estimation of the model 3.12. We use an Arellano-Bond
estimator15, which transforms regressors by differencing, then uses a general-
ized moments method. Lagged values of the dependant variable and exoge-
nous variables are used as instruments. We use the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-
Bond estimator which is a variation allowing to take into account eventual
unit roots in the data16.
Results
The model is estimated over 101 serials, for which at least 10 episodes have
been broadcast. We correct for heteroskedasticity in the data using robust
14Source: Allocine´ data
15see Arellano and Bond 1991
16A unit root is a feature of non-stationary stochastic processes that can cause statistical
interference. An exogenous shock can have long lasting effects on such processes and
change their trajectory.
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standard-errors. The results are shown in table 3.2. We estimate a model of
myopic addiction, where the anticipations for the future consumption are not
taken into account and the rational addiction model specified by equation
3.12. For the second model, we make an assumption of perfect expectations
and use actual values of the future audience in the regression, as we argue
that a consumer can accurately anticipate their future consumption.
Table 3.2: Estimation results: rational addiction model
Variables Myopic addiction model (Std. Err.) Rational addiction model (Std. Err.)
Audiencet−1 0.389∗∗ (0.119) 0.298∗∗ (0.1)
Audiencet+1 0.236∗∗ (0.054)
Advertising -13.43† (7.52) -14.39† (7.9)
Year -219.7∗∗ (52.3) -213.6∗∗ (51.8)
Grade 1.9 (481.3) 332.2 (446.6)
TF1 3987.5∗∗ (762.1) 3397.8∗∗ (867.5)
TF1 Group -393.9 (306.4) -607.8† (365.0)
Season (summer) -135.5 (139.3) -123.0 (113.6)
France -35.5 (162.1) 1.7 (195.1)
USA -104.6 (244.6) -41.5 (196.4)
M6 Group -320.0 (407) -289.8 (321.4)
M6 1595.0∗∗ (317.2) 1294.7∗∗ (314.7)
France TV 900∗ (413.9) 634.3† (381.0)
N 2473 2473
The results shown in table 3.2 support the hypothesis that TV series
viewing follows a model of rational addiction: both effects from past and
future consumption are positive and significant. The effect of advertising is
negative and significant at the 10% threshold.
When the error terms are independent and identically distributed, their
first order differentiations are serially correlated. So, as expected, the Arellano-
Bond test rejects the hypothesis H0 for the first order of differentiation:
H0: There is no autocorrelation of residuals
H0 is no longer rejected for second order differentiation. Thus, we don’t
detect any specification problem in the estimated model.
Estimating the model with catch-up audience (table 3.10 in the appendix)
proves a significant effect of the series’ appreciation by spectators. We find
a significant and positive effect of past live viewing on the present catch-up
consumption.
We also estimate this model on a similar database of independent-episodes
series. The results are presented in the appendix. We find a significant effect
for both past and future consumption, though significantly lower than for
serials.
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3.4.3 Case study 1: Plus Belle la Vie
In the previous section, we provide evidence for an addictive effect on TV
series demand. This effect is characterized by the strong influence of viewing
episode n− 1 in viewing episode n, and explains the link between serials and
non-linear consumption. This autoregressive aspect of demand supports the
modeling using ARIMA processes and time-series methods. The main limit
to this methodology is we can study only one series at a time.
We propose here a case study of the French serial, or soap opera Plus
Belle la Vie. We consider the soap opera to be a particular case of serial,
as the episodes are likend to each other, featuring family-type intrigues, ro-
mances and moral conflicts. The specificity of these series is that they are
generally broadcast on a daily basis, and during access-prime time hours17.
This choice is mostly due to the high number of observations (more than
1300 episodes), and to the fact that its broadcasting was uninterrupted for
the whole period. This series gives a good example of habitual effects, as
defined by equation 3.6, as most of the audience is live, and the broadcasting
pattern each day at a precise hour establishes an appointment for consumers.
Table 3.3 presents the evolution of live audience (actual and differenti-
ated) over the period. We observe peaks in the audience, that we interpret as
season’s finale effects. Negative peaks can be interpreted as rebroadcasts of
old episodes, independent from the current narrative. We reject the presence
of a unit root in the data using an augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
Table 3.3: Live audience for Plus Belle la Vie and first-difference series
The model we chose to estimate is a seasonal autoregressive integrated
17Access prime time is the time-frame preceding prime-time, generally from 6 to 8p.m.
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moving average process. The autoregressive part (AR) indicates that we
regress the dependant variable on its own lagged values. This allows us to
take into account the effects of addiction or habits. The moving average (MA)
equation allows to smooth out short-term fluctuations of the error term,
as well as serial correlation between these residuals. The autocorrelations
and partial autocorrelations diagram, presented in the appendix (figure 3.12)
support a strong weekly seasonal effect. The ARMA model can be written
as follows: 1− p′∑
i=1
αiL
i
Xt =
(
1 +
q∑
i=1
θiL
i
)
εt (3.13)
Where L is the lag operator, αi the parameters of the AR part, θi the pa-
rameters of the MA part and εt the error terms, assumed to be independant,
identically distributed variables drawn from a normal distribution with zero
mean.
As the series has positive autocorrelations out to a high number of lags,
we also estimate the model on the differenciated series. Representations of
the live audience for Plus Belle la Vie are shown in figure 3.3. The model is
estimated with different specifications for robustness checks, and includes a
seasonal component of 5 days. Results are shown in table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Estimation of live audience as a seasonal autoregressive process
(1) (2) (3)
Alive ∆Alive ∆Alive
ARMA
AR(1) 0.599∗∗ 0.499∗∗ 0.441∗∗
(26.67) (56.06) (34.64)
AR(2) 0.0129
(0.90)
AR(3) 0.0125
(0.63)
MA(1) -0.125∗∗ -1.000∗∗ -0.959∗∗
(-4.73) (-71.84) (-114.51)
ARMA5
AR(1) 0.886∗∗ 0.0978∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(45.91) (3.76) (6.26)
MA(1) -0.601∗∗ -0.764∗∗ -0.833∗∗
(-24.16) (-33.56) (-42.03)
sigma
440.5∗∗ 449.6 450.3∗∗
(144.27) (.) (134.72)
N 1306 1300 1300
t statistics in parentheses
†p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.001
The results presented in table 3.4 confirm those of the previous rational
addiction model. Previous consumption, modeled as the AR(1) term is sig-
nificant and strong, between 0.4 and 0.6, both for the non-differentiated and
the differentiated model. The second and third lags of live audience do not
appear to have a significant effect on current consumption. The seasonal
component of the model is significant as predicted.
We estimate a similar model for catch-up audience. We include the live
audience of the previous episode as an exogenous regressor. Results shown
in table 3.14 support an effect of the live audience of the previous episode
for both the differenciated and non-differenciated models. The autoregres-
sive and moving average terms are significant and of comparable size as the
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estimates for the rational addiction model of the previous section.
Table 3.5: Estimation of catch-up audience as a seasonal autoregressive pro-
cess
(1) (2)
∆ Replay Audience Replay Audience
∆ Live Audiencet−1 0.00904∗
(3.12)
Live Audiencet−1 0.00890∗
(3.15)
ARMA
AR(1) 0.267∗∗ 0.910∗
(11.69) (3.25)
AR(2) 0.00890 -0.138
(0.35) (-1.50)
MA(1) -1.000 -0.641†
(-0.00) (-2.32)
ARMA5
AR(1) 0.157∗∗ 1.020∗∗
(5.41) (23.62)
AR(2) 0.0598† -0.0680†
(1.97) (-1.98)
MA(1) -0.863∗∗ -0.759∗∗
(-40.45) (-20.27)
sigma
78.72 78.11∗∗
(0.00) (71.29)
N 1299 1305
t statistics in parentheses
†p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.001
These results provide evidence of strong habits or addictive effects in the
consumption of TV series. This holds in the case of independent-episodes se-
ries but these effects are significantly lower than when the narrative develops
over the whole season.
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3.4.4 Case study 2: Desperate Housewives
We provide here a time-series analysis of the series Desperate Housewives,
broadcast by M6 between 8.50 and 10 p.m, for two seasons (2011 and 2012).
This program is an American comedy and drama series, roduced by ABC Stu-
dios and Cherry Production and aired from 2005 to 2012 in France. The view-
ing of this series follows a different pattern from Plus Belle la Vie. First, its
broadcasting is on a weekly basis rather than daily. The narrative structure
of Desperate Housewives is widely different from this of France’s favourite
soap opera. Seasons are shorter, episodes are longer and more closely linked
within a season.
Results from the ADF test attest for the presence of a unit root in the
data. Thus, we will work only on the differentiated series.
Table 3.6: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
Spread Critical value for the 5% threshold Test value p-value
2 -2.966 -1.939 0.3141
3 -2.969 -1.780 0.39065
4 -2.972 -1.435 0.5655
5 -2.975 -1.420 0.5725
We estimate an ARIMA(1,1,1) model to account for the live audience of
the series. This corresponds to the following specification:
∆An = ∆αAn−1 + C + εn + θεn−1 (3.14)
Results are presented in table 3.7
Table 3.7: ARIMA model for Desperate Housewives
Estimated coefficient Test value
C -15.64 0.06
AR(1) 0.49 0.007
MA(1) -1 0.00
Test values for Bartlett and Ljung-Box fail to reject the hypothesis: H′:
The residual follow a random noise distribution. We interpret the presence
of a unit root in the series as the fact audience is susceptible to both positive
and negative shocks, and does not go back to an equilibrium level after such
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a variation. The means that the broadcasting of a program with such an
audience profile is very dependent on the presence of a catch-up offer, which
smooths consumption and avoids shocks.
Another consequence is that if a popular program (such as a sport game
or another TV series) is broadcast on a competing network, it could result
in a persisting negative shock for the series. The channel thus has incentives
to shift the broadcast to a more convenient time, or rely on its catch-up
platform. This effect highlights the better adequation of the SVOD and VOD
platform broadcasting technology for such series, as they insure against the
risk of a negative shock.
Figure 3.11: Testing for rupture in the estimation
We test for rupture in the estimation between season 1 and 2 using the
chow test. The test hypothesis is:
H0: Estimated coefficients in season 1 and 2 are equal
We reject H0 at the 5% threshold.
It is interesting to note that the consumption models for season 1 and 2
are different. This can be explained by the rational addiction framework: the
consumption stock depreciates with time. If too much time passes between
the broadcast of the 2 seasons, some consumers will stop watching the series.
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The audience base should stabilize around the core viewers after a number
of seasons.
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3.5 Conclusion
The evolution in broadcasting technology, and the growth of online video
services, led to a change in the demand function for TV series. We show how
new consumption patterns, free from the constraint of the linear television
program are conducive to the emergence of addiction effects.
The existence of addictive effects for certain types of TV series results in
a delinearization of consumption. These effects can explain the competitive
dynamics observed in the market for free-to-air fiction broadcasting. Chan-
nels that do not strongly value their catch-up platform are rely more on the
broadcasting of movies or series with independent episodes.
These results have strong industrial and policy implications for the French
TV market. The new forms of the demand function structures a captive
audience for online platforms. The decline in popularity of the independent-
episodes series and increased competition lead to a fall in profitability for
free-to-air broadcasters. Their difficulty to monetize their non-linear view-
ers makes it less profitable for them to finance serials. As those channels
represent one of the main investors in the French audiovisual industry, it
is possible that the production of serials in France is suboptimal. Giving
free channels better incentives to invest in such programs by reforming the
partition of rights could help in re-orienting the industry towards serials.
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3.6 Appendix
Variable
Date
Time of broadcast
Duration
Channel
Program name
Program label
Genre 32 modes (thriller, animation etc.)
Live audience
-Older than 4
-4-14 years-old
-15-24 years-old
-25-34 years-old
-34-49 years-old
-50 and more
-Men
-Women
-Lives in Iˆle de France
-Lives outside of Iˆle de France
Global audience
-Older than 4
-4-14 years-old
-15-24 years-old
-25-34 years-old
-34-49 years-old
-50 and more
-Men
-Women
-Lives in Iˆle de France
-Lives outside of Iˆle de France
Table 3.8: Description of the database
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Type Definition Examples
Independent
episodes series
Episodes are independent. The unity of the
series is due to the presence of recurring char-
acters or places.
Columbo, Navarro,
The Simpsons
Serialized se-
ries/serial
The story takes place over a season or more.
The viewer must watch all episodes in order
to understand the narrative
Game of Thrones,
Desperate Housewives
Soap opera Particular case of serial. Features family-
type intrigues, romances and moral conflicts.
Generally broadcast on a daily basis
Plus Belle la Vie, The
Young and the Rest-
less.
Table 3.9: Definition of narrative structures
3.6.1 Rational addiction model
Table 3.10: Rational addiction model on catch-up audience
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Audiencet−1 (catch-up) 0.163∗ (0.070)
Audiencet+1 (catch-up) 0.120∗ (0.053)
Audiencet 0.089∗∗ (0.016)
Publicite´ 0.325 (0.369)
Year 15.193† (8.638)
TF1 -17.045 (75.364)
TF1 Group -65.615 (45.112)
Summer -7.279 (11.939)
France 22.982 (24.892)
USA 2.162 (26.136)
M6 Group -70.599 (59.445)
M6 6.094 (43.776)
France TV -57.019∗ (29.050)
Note 128.469∗∗ (39.985)
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Table 3.11: Rational addiction model: Independent-episodes series
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Audiencet−1 0.229∗∗ (0.051)
Audiencet+1 0.101∗∗ (0.034)
Year -83.648 (53.068)
TF1 4000.792∗∗ (407.804)
TF1 Group 117.537 (236.826)
Summer -311.691∗∗ (68.447)
France -305.212∗ (130.647)
USA 431.298† (236.203)
M6 Group -176.585 (347.082)
M6 2188.294∗∗ (314.153)
France TV 1984.754∗∗ (340.142)
Episode -1.314 (3.786)
Table 3.11 presents the estimation results on the database for independent
episodes series. The effect of past and future consumption is still significant,
though lower than for serials. In addition, the effect of future (anticipated)
consumption is very low compared to this of the serials, which suggests that
consumption of series with independent episodes is more of a habit than an
addiction.
3.6.2 ARIMA Models
Table 3.12: Autocorrelations for live audience (Plus Belle la Vie)
In the previous models, we take into account a one-week diffusion cycle. The
evolution of audience, presented in the figure 3.12 shows longer variations,
77
on a seasonal scale. We provide a modelling of the audience on a monthly
basis.
Figure 3.12: Mean of monthly audience
Figure 3.13: Monthly live audience for Plus Belle la Vie (2011-2015)
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Table 3.13: Autocorrelations for monthly live audience (Plus Belle la Vie)
Table 3.14: Estimation results : arima
(1) (2)
ARIMA(1, 0, 0)× (1, 0, 0)12 ARIMA(1, 0, 2)× (1, 0, 1)12
Live audience
Intercept 4690.4∗∗ 4679.4∗∗
(26.37) (10.08)
ARMA
AR(1) 0.630∗∗ 0.878∗∗
(5.99) (7.61)
MA(1) -0.432∗
(-3.08)
MA(2) 0.0745
(0.52)
ARMA12
AR(1) 0.715∗∗ 0.942∗∗
(8.31) (14.02)
MA(1) -0.449
(-1.59)
sigma
Constante 230.0∗∗ 201.7∗∗
(12.04) (9.73)
N 60 60
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Chapter 4
Regulation game and copyright
in digital media industries: the
destructive-creation of the
French audiovisual ecosystem
Abstract. Media industries are facing radical transformations due
to the evolution of broadcasting technologies, consumer behavior and
new business models. Digitization modifies externalities and inter-
nalization mechanisms within the industrial ecosystem formed by the
production and broadcasting firms.
While the American studios are reinforcing their vertical integration to
compete with new entrants, French incumbents remain very scattered.
This situation stems from France’s institutional path for creating au-
diovisual markets, privileging vertical disintegration and dispersion of
copyright.
We show how entry of new players, bypassing traditional means of
transmission challenges the regulated sharing of property rights. In
the early 2000s, a first wave of new players, allowed by the increase
in the number of terrestrial channels, has been internalized by the
incumbents, by the sharing of the rent in a positive-sum game. The
transition to a negative-sum game in recent years prevents a similar
process from taking place and may unlock the regulation game by way
of creative-destruction.
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4.1 Introduction
The French audiovisual ecosystem reflects the institutional choices made in
the 1960’s and the 1980’s regarding the television externalities and the ways
to internalize them. Television in France started as a state monopoly and
has remained as such until 1984. During this period, administrative rules
prevailed. No ownership was formally granted, neither for the broadcasting
licenses, nor for TV programs.
The state monopoly was justified by the political instability of the Fifth
republic installed by De Gaulle in 1958, after the unrest of the Algeria war.
The political power wanted to keep control over the most powerful mass me-
dia (Peyrefitte 2002) while censorship and the allocation of subsidies muzzled
the cinema (Gimello-Mesplomb 2003). The opening of the TV market was
decided in 1984 by President Mitterrand who granted a broadcasting license
to a private company in order to set up a pay-TV service. France is the only
country in the world where TV de-monopolization started with a pay-TV
channel on terrestrial broadcast.
The first broadcasting license was granted for free to Canal Plus, who
did also benefit from market exclusivities such as the right to air a film one
year only after its theatrical release, or the right to show adult movies. In
counterpart, the broadcaster should spend a fixed share of his turnover to
buy films and TV shows from independent producers. The TV operator was
chosen for his political loyalty. The wide differentiation between the old pub-
lic TV and the glamourous Canal Plus, accessible countrywide, boosted the
success of the service. Therefore, independent producers were allocated large
budgets, which generated the surge of new talents as well as an institutional
gratitude from the entertainment community.
The conditions of this first deal shaped all the further concessions granted
to commercial broadcasters. The principle was to separate the broadcasting
license from the ownership of the shows. The same scheme applied to all
Hertzian channels – whether new or formerly public – granted to private op-
erators. The license was given for free, the operator was selected through a
beauty contest, and obligations were attached to the license for commission-
ing and funding independent producers.
Finally:
• All broadcasters, including the public ones, were granted free terrestrial
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licenses in exchange for funding independent cinema and TV producers.
Through this funding, the TVs would acquire temporary broadcasting
rights for the programs.
• The producers flourished in a large ecosystem gathering 700 companies
specialized in cinema and 2000 companies focused on TV shows. These
producers kept the ownership of the copyrights.
An objective of this regulation was to prevent the broadcasters to amass copy-
rights so to restrain their assets to the broadcasting concessions. From an
institutional standpoint, it kept the broadcasters under political control. The
principle was almost comparable to what D. C. North, Wallis, and Weingast
2009 call a “limited access order” where monopolies are granted to individ-
uals against political allegiance. More precisely, the TV ecosystem was an
island of limited access order in an open access (a market economy) State.
The so-called “cultural exception” was the ideological justification, the belief
associated with it. On the economic side, it did make sense as long as TV
was the only access to residential viewers. The broadcasters were even given
new licenses (new accesses) when digital terrestrial TV increased the compe-
tition among channels. Therefore, the copyrights of the shows were mostly
valued through the broadcast on domestic TV. Although their residual value
was small, producers were attached to it as a patrimonial asset.
The 50-year growth of the TV market has been a positive sum game be-
tween broadcasters and producers. It dramatically changed with the surge
of over the top (OTT) services1. The Internet has brought in a large set of
externalities (both in transactions and in media) that could not get regulated
with the same tools as television. Therefore, a new competition arose that
compromised the former equilibrium.
The funny thing is that reforming the TV ecosystem has proven quite
impossible, for reevaluating the obligations and the rights is perceived by
producers as an expropriation. During the fifty years of the TV game, the
producers with easy access to media have organized to protect their interests.
Any threat regarding what they consider as their patrimony is promptly de-
nounced as an offence against French culture. Since 2008, great reforms are
periodically announced that rapidly end in anticlimax.
1Over the top is a term used to describe content providers distributing streaming media
over the Internet, bypassing the traditional means of telecommunications
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The topic of this chapter is then: how does this path-dependent media
ecosystem adapt to the new paradigm of platforms? Who are the winners
and the losers of the regulation game? How do the winners keep on captur-
ing it when the sum of the game turns into negative? If the system can’t be
reformed, how will its destructive-creation proceed? To the benefit of whom?
A subsidiary advantage of the French TV regulation is that it provides
extensive data regarding all the orders related to TV obligations. It allows
to illustrate how some producers have captured the regulation to their own
benefit and how the entry of platforms has modified the game. In the next
section we detail the TV regulation and its impact on both the industrial
organization and the performance of the sector. The third section examines
the impact of the entry of over-the-top platforms on the ecosystem.
4.2 The System of obligatory funding and its
implications
4.2.1 The French system of obligatory funding
The French regulation scheme is based on a partition of property rights be-
tween licenses to broadcast and copyright. The licenses are granted to private
firms in exchange for obligatory funding and broadcasting of the French cin-
ema and audiovisual production.
The terms and level of quotas, concerning both investment in independent
production and in so-called heritage works2 , vary according to various crite-
ria such as the broadcaster’s turnover, its presence or not on the terrestrial
network, the channel’s business model and the type of program broadcast.
The broadcasting quotas concern the share of broadcasting hours of Eu-
ropean works, or of works of French original expression, that is to say works
produced entirely or mainly in their original version in the French language
or in a regional language in use in France. Similarly, European audiovisual
works are produced in member states of the European Union or, under cer-
tain conditions, works from European third countries.
2Defined by the CNC as original audiovisual works with a heritage vocation that are
of particular cultural, social, technical, scientific or economic interest.
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Quotas for contributions to audiovisual production are imposed on chan-
nels that devote more than 20% of their broadcasting time to audiovisual
works, or whose turnover exceeds ¤350 million. The cinema investment obli-
gations concern channels broadcasting more than 52 movies or 104 unique
cinema broadcasts per year, as well as specialized channels. Table 4.5 in the
appendix present a summary of the terms and conditions offered to broad-
casters with regards to their obligations. In all cases, a minimum of 75%
of the investment must be directed to independent production. This inde-
pendency clause creates a separation of the broadcasting and production
industries.
This division of property rights is accompanied by a market organiza-
tion fixed by the law which specifies the exclusive window granted to each
contributor, so-called chronologie des me´dias. This regulatory device allows
the broadcasters to exploit movies according to a timetable reflecting their
level of investment. Each window provides an exclusivity guaranteed by law.
It operates a discrimination scheme through which different versions of the
movie are gradually marketed at a decreasing price, and reflects a principle
of coherence in relation to the weight and obligations of each party in the
pre-financing of the movies.
This system is unique, as exclusive broadcasting windows are usually
freely negotiated between the relevant parties. It also protects the French
movies from the foreign competition: non-French studios can benefit from
the one-year TV window3 , only if they sell to the pay-TV duopoly, Canal
Plus and OCS4 . Otherwise, they have to wait for three years5 before access-
ing free TV. In the meantime, their release investment has been lost.
In 2009, a new exclusive window for SVOD platforms complying with the
obligations system is added six months after free-to-air TV. Timeframes have
been shortened in 2018, in accordance with requests from broadcasters.
38 months from 2018 onwards
4Orange Cinema Series, a subsidiary of Orange, the French telco incumbent.
530 months from 2018 onwards
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Figure 4.1: Window time-frame, Chronologie des Me´dias
4.2.2 Data and empirical methodology
This study is based on a database completed by the CNC6, including all or-
ders for audiovisual programs over the 2007-2018 timeframe.
Each of these orders corresponds to an application for admission to the
Audiovisual Support Fund (COSIP), which represents 21% of total audiovi-
sual funding in 2014. To be eligible, these programs must qualify as heritage
works, defined as “original audiovisual works with a heritage vocation that
are of particular cultural, social, technical, scientific or economic interest”.
Such a work must belong to one of the following genres: fiction, animation,
creative documentary or recreation and recording of live performances based
on a unitary and autonomous work. So-called flux programs (news, sports,
games, talk shows, reality shows, . . . ) are excluded from this database. Fi-
nally, to be eligible, these works must be produced with the assistance of
authors, main actors, technical collaborators of French creation, or nation-
als of European countries, and technical industries established in these same
6The CNC (National Centre for Cinema and the Moving Image) is an agency of the
French Ministry of Culture, responsible for the production and promotion of cinematic
and audiovisual arts in France. Its role is to administer the regulation of cinema, support
its economy, as well as this of audiovisual arts, and protect the French cinematographic
heritage. It also collects extensive data on the funding of audiovisual and cinema works
in France
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countries.
This first database is completed by another one indexing all French-
initiated movies approved by the CNC during the period. It details the
year of approval, the date of release in theaters, the title, the producer(s),
the estimated budget as well as the details of the financing plan with contri-
butions from the various French and foreign partners.
Very few producers are active both on the audiovisual and movie produc-
tion sectors. Between 2007 and 2014, 270 companies produced audiovisual
and cinematographic works, out of 3658. The production ecosystem is com-
plex and difficult to assess: many companies are capitalistically linked to the
same entity. This results in an overestimation of the number of producers
and therefore underestimation of the industry’s level of concentration. We
choose to consider the subsidiaries as belonging to the parent group. This
cross-checking is carried out using the data from Ecran Total grouping to-
gether the capitalist links between the various production companies.
Genre Frequency % Budget 2007-2018 (M¤) Average budget by hours (¤) Annual volume (hours)
TV Magazine 515 1,42 368 122 942 382
Live Entertainment 4 758 13,11 1 166 143 145 736
Documentary 24 058 66,28 4 662 158 217 2 415
Non-fiction Total 29 331 80,81 6 197 141 434 3 534
Animation 712 1,96 2 416 636 022 316
Fiction 3 034 8,36 8 558 980 616 815
Cinema 3 219 8,87 15 274 2 711 401 469
Fiction Total 6 965 19,19 26 249 1 442 680 1 601
Total 36 296 100,00 32 445 792 057 5 134
Table 4.1: Database Description
Table 4.1 summarizes the cinema and audiovisual production over the
2007-2018 timeframe. Fiction works represent a majority of the total invest-
ment (79%) for 24% of produced hours.
4.2.3 Industrial organization and regulation capture
We implement a hierarchical classification algorithm to describe the produc-
tion industry for audiovisual and cinema works. Details of the methodology
can be found in the appendix. We present a division of the industry in 4
different classes of producers, mainly differentiated by their annual budget
and volume of production.
Both the cinema and audiovisual sectors are highly concentrated: a small
group of large firms take up a large share of the orders (table 4.2). The
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audiovisual production industry is dominated by fifty producers (2.3% of the
industry) who account for 25% of the market in terms of total budget. The
most productive class, the leaders declare an average annual budget close to
¤70M and produce 24 times more hours of programs than their competitors.
Most of the registered producers are absent from the market for capital-
intensive programs, such as fiction and specialize in magazine or documen-
tary. The group of small producers (85% of the industry) produce on average
3 hours of content each year (one or two programs), with an average hourly
budget of ¤30 000.
The cinema sector is more concentrated with 25% of the total budget
captured by 0.4% of the producers. As our dataset doesn’t give us a precise
breakdown of the co-productions funding (35% of movies), we consider that
co-producers have an equivalent contribution to the film budget. In doing
so, we underestimate the share of the largest and overestimate the share of
the smallest. Despite all this, the average allocated budget per film of a large
cinema producer is ¤6M, three times the budget of 98% of the firms.
Producer group Frequency (%) Average annual budget (M¤) Market share (over budget) Average production (hours/year)
Leaders 0.1 % 69.2 9.1% 170.2
Large 2.2 % 4.2 15.4 % 29.9
Medium 11.9 % 2.1 40.7 % 10.1
Small 85.8 % 0.3 34.8 % 2.9
Total 100% 0.6 100% 7.1
Table 4.2: The Audiovisual production industry - Clustering
Producer group Frequency (%) Average annual budget (M¤) Market share (over budget) Average production (moves/year)
Large 0.4% 43.5 25.6 % 7
Medium 21.0 % 4.7 57.9 % 2
Small 78.6% 2.6 16.5 % 1
Total 100% 4.2 100% 2
Table 4.3: The Cinema production industry - Clustering
Both the audiovisual and cinema industries are dependent on broadcast-
ers’ funding, as well as on various subsidies. This is especially true for au-
diovisual fiction, where TV channels represent on average 70% of the total
budget. The production ecosystem is mostly constituted of suppliers without
equity capital, whose survival depends on the mandatory orders of televi-
sion channels. In contrast, the larger firms capture a large portion of the
obligatory investment. 76% of the leaders’ budget come from broadcasters,
compared to 52% for small structures.
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Figure 4.2: Audiovisual Fiction and cinema Funding
The existence of this extremely dispersed production sector is due to a
number of factors, including the obligatory investments. The lack of barriers
to entry in the production sector makes it possible for new entrants to set
up a production structure and get funds from broadcasters. The discourse
of the French cultural exception, allows producer lobbies to obtain diversity
clauses in the regulatory game.
The partition of property rights puts the ecosystem on a path of vertical
disintegration between production and broadcasting. This separation is es-
tablished by the Tasca decrees (1990), which include a clause of independence
in mandatory investments (75% of investment should go to a capitalistically
independent producer7 ).
As television channels obtain only an exclusive broadcasting right as a
compensation for their initial investment, they have low incentive to order
exportable programs. This results in an orientation of the production ecosys-
tem towards fulfilling domestic demand. Thus, the property rights given to
producers have a low value, as the demand outside of the antenna of TV
channels is poor. Very few productions have an international funding strat-
egy (figure 4.3), which reflects the ecosystem’s national orientation.
In contrast, the studio model adopted in the USA or UK allows invest-
7Article 11 of the 90-67 decree defines an independent production company as a com-
pany:
• In which the channel does not hold, directly or indirectly more than 5% of the
capital
• Who does not own, directly or indirectly more than 5% of the capital of the channel
• with which the company or service does not have links constituting a lasting com-
munity of interest
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Figure 4.3: International funding strategies
ments to be internalized on several media, and thus gives incentives to resell
and export (figure 4.4) .
Figure 4.4: TV and Cinema exports
4.2.4 How works the regulation game
Several institutional reports call for an in-depth reform of the regulatory
system (Vallet 2013, Boutonnat 2018), in order to reflect the change in tech-
nology, externalities and new entrants. However, a reform can be perceived
as an expropriation by the producers, especially the bigger ones who benefit
from the obligatory funding. Even players not directly gaining anything from
the regulation may fear situations of uncertainty and the risk of imbalance
that would result from a reform. Institutional change always induce a period
of disequilibrium, which makes support for such changes more costly (Sened
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1991, Fink 1987).
Reforming requires this diagnostic phase, but also a strategic one, to mo-
bilize support and avoid criticism, a phase during which it is necessary to
“find a grip on the institution”, i.e. to find room for maneuver in order to
be able to act (Lagroye and Offerle´ 2011). The winners of the regulatory
system, which we identify as the largest producers, have a more solid grip
on the institution than the reformer: they can mobilize coalitions to avoid
change, while the potential beneficiaries of the change ignore the long-term
benefits they could gain from a reform. They are also less united than the
proponents of the institutions. The larger producers are more mobilized to
maintain the status quo than smaller producers for reform, but in addition,
not all players are equally gifted with power. Gimello-Mesplomb 2003 show
how, since the late 1940s, film producers have been able to organize collec-
tively in order to defend their interests.
The collective organization bodies of the cinema professionals, in the form
of associations or trade unions give them a strong capacity to mobilize and
defend their interests. These are grouped into three main organizations, the
ARP, the BLIC and the BLOC. The ARP (Association des Re´alisateurs et
Producteurs) is mostly composed of employers’ organizations and defends the
producers’ interests. Its position is the absence of justification to change the
regulation, as producers have no incentive to change. They benefit from an
automatic support fund after their first production, a source of income is
ensured by the obligations, and rely on the intermittent status of to reduce
their fixed costs (Menger 2011).
The BLIC (Bureau de liaison de l’industrie cine´matographique) is com-
posed of several associations and federations of distributors and theater-
networks. It defends a form of protectionism of the cinema ecosystem: media
timeframe, strict control over movie screening. Several reports (Gomez 2011,
Kopp 2016, Boutonnat 2018) point to the lack of transparency of the sector,
mostly due to the absence of contractual relations.
These interest groups have an influence on the political debate, and are
regularly heard in the context of the elaboration of reform projects. They
can easily mobilize talents (actors, directors) to defend the cultural exception
if their interests are threatened.
Finally, Knight and Sened 1995 show that the long-term maintenance of
an institution can be explained by its ability to provide distributional bene-
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fits to those who have the power and/or authority to change it. In that sense,
the benefits distributed to small businesses (diversity investment clauses for
CANAL+ for instance) are a key element to consolidate their adherence to
the status quo.
4.3 Entry of platforms and transition to a
negative-sum game (2015-2018)
Digitization, and the evolution of broadcasting technologies lead to a progres-
sive fall of barriers to entry. With the generalization of broadband access,
the French administered ecosystem is facing a sudden opening to competition
from international players, bypassing traditional means of distribution, and
regulation.
4.3.1 Digitization and the fall of barriers to entry
Digitization, the process of allowing the transmission of information in a dig-
ital format, changes the nature and distribution of rents in the ecosystem
(Weeds and Seabright 2006). In the context of analogue broadcasting, trans-
mission capacity formed a major barrier to entry, as the number of available
channels was restricted by spectrum availability. Broadcasters earned mas-
sive rents, which were compensated by the obligatory investments and quotas.
The fall of costs of reproducing and transmitting information, and digital
compression allowing for the transmission of more channels than what was
previously possible with analogue technology reduced these barriers to entry
in the broadcasting market. The competitive introduction of DTT channels
to new entrants in the early 2000s posed a first threat to incumbents. This
was cancelled by the gradual purchase of DTT operators by Hertzian groups,
who maintained their position in a growing market (TF1 group takes over
TMC and NT1 in 2009). In that sense, the first consequences of digitization
were internalized by the ecosystem, and the changes in competition took place
in a national and highly regulated frame. The growing market for television
content allowed for rent sharing between incumbents and new entrants in a
positive-sum game.
The entry of platforms, starting in 2014 with Netflix, creates a break in
this process. The roll-out of high-speed internet connection allows entry of
over the top (OTT) operators, distributing content over the internet without
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any intermediary. Their services are marketed directly online to the con-
sumer, with access possible through mobile devices or television. This mode
of broadcasting is not subject to the scarcity of frequencies, nor barriers to
entry. Competition then takes on an international aspect, and is accompa-
nied by a change in usage and consumption patterns.
The entry of OTT platforms is correlated to a gradual decline in television
audiences (figure 4.4):
15+ 15-24 25-49 50+
2011 3h57 1h59 3h45 4h56
2017 -1.3% (3h54) -23% (1h31) -12%(3h17) +3% (5h05)
Table 4.4: Evolution of the individual watching time: live TV+replay
(Me´diame´trie)
According to Concurrence 2019, this trend is confirmed by a -6.3 min-
utes fall in 2018. CSA 2018 establishes a causal link between consumption
of audiovisual content online and this fall of TV consumption, especially for
younger audiences.
Development of online advertising, weakens revenue for free to air chan-
nels8. Similarly, this new competition weakens pay-TV channels by offering
similar offers at a lower cost. According to CNC and CSA , the low price
offered by OTT offers encourages consumers to leave traditional offers, and
could explain a 3.5% decline of pay-TV revenue in Europe between 2015 and
2018. Analysis of individual consumption time for free-to-air television shows
a fall of audience between 2011-2017 (figure 4.5). This fall of audience also
impacts advertising revenue.
As for online advertising, taking up a larger market share, revenue is cap-
tured by the search engines and social networks, with Google and Facebook
at the top of the list, while audiovisual incumbents occupy a weak position
(9% market share in 20179 for audiovisual operators) and benefit from lim-
ited growth prospects. (IREP 2018).
In that sense, this second opening of the French audiovisual market shifts
the regulation game to negative-sum. Over the top broadcasting puts an
end to the technological oligopoly of broadcasters, and thus lowers the value
8Decision n°18-A-03, 6/03/2018 autorite´ de concurrence
9Observatoire de l’e-pub, 20e e´dition, PWC 2018
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Figure 4.5: TV audience
of their concessions, which was an important source of rents. Control over
these means of distribution of content no longer grants exclusive access to
the consumer. In this sense, platforms threaten to end the limited access
order of the audiovisual industry.
4.3.2 Consequences on the competition game
This opening of the broadcasting market results in control over scarce con-
tent gaining importance over control over the means of transmission. As
sports rights or other valuable content has always been a key element in the
competition between broadcasters (Steiner 1952), the increase in the number
of channels and opening of the broadcasting market to a wide range of new
players reinforces its value (Weeds and Seabright 2006).
As content is becoming easier to create and broadcast, the proliferation of
screens and stories makes the viewer’s attention even rarer. TV that was the
only home media able to convey video stories has become a source amongst
many others. Even social networks have become competitors. Their success
can eventually be explained by the attention paid by each member to the
creation of her own personal stories.
In that sense, control over premium content becomes the main source of
rents, as such content would guarantee a high audience.
Nicita and Rossi 2009 use the notion of substitutability with other contents to
define premium. Such contents can be defined as specific information goods
characterized by a low degree of substitutability with other contents from the
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consumer’s perspective. In other words, low quality content is not a good
substitute for high quality premium content. Examples of such programs for
the TV market include successful movies or series, as well as sports rights.
Over-the-top broadcasting changes the nature of competition for attention.
By investing in addictive stories or programs, series-centered SVOD players
make their content even less substitutable from the consumer’s point of view
(V. Lavialle and O. Bomsel 2017). In that sense, competition focuses on rad-
ical differentiation of content, in order to keep the attention of subscribers
as long as possible.
On the production side, investments to vertically differentiate content
add to the already high fixed costs in the industry, as premium content is
generally capital-intensive10 , involving high sunk costs and economies of
scale. This leads to an increase in market concentration, by pushing small
producers who cannot bear such high costs towards marginal formats.
Figure 4.6: Rise in capital-intensity of audiovisual programs
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate this process of rise in capital intensity of
programs, leading to a concentration of the production sector between 2007
and 2018.
The rules of vertical separation between the production and broadcast-
ing sectors give French producers an incentive in the short term to sell their
under-exploited catalogue collections, financed by national channels, to plat-
forms.
10 Fiction programs cost on average 1M€ per hour, 2.8M¤for cinema, compared to
150k¤for documentary
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Figure 4.7: Concentration among the fiction producers
The current regulation system also suffers from the profound changes in
uses, directly linked to these evolutions in the transmission of information
(see previous section). The possibility of accessing content on various devices
and time frees the spectator from the television schedule. The window time-
frame, which guaranteed the value of movies for each broadcaster is made
obsolete: consumers demand a quick availability of content, and may turn to
piracy if not the case. The American ISP Sandvine’s Global Internet Phe-
nomena report (Sandvine 2019) shows that peer-to-peer piracy is growing
after a long period of decline (BitTorrent representing 3% of global down-
stream and 22% of upstream traffic in 2018 in the US). The report points
to the dispersion and exclusivities of premium content as an explanation for
the growth.
4.3.3 The destructive creation of the French audiovi-
sual ecosystem
The status quo maintained in recent years is threatened in a context where
SVOD platforms play a major role on the market, without complying with
the rules of the chronologie des me´dias or creative funding obligations, while
incumbent players are in great difficulty. Pre-purchases, particularly of pay-
TV channels, are in the center of the French cinema financing model. In
accordance with its obligations, Canal+ has pre-purchased 107 films in 2016
for a total of 141.7 million euros. However, as this investment is directly
correlated to turnover of the channel, of which it must represent 12.5%, any
decline in the broadcaster’s activity will transfer to the movie industry.
95
The entry of OTT platforms and the decline in profitability of TV chan-
nels shift the French regulation game from positive-sum to negative-sum (V.
Lavialle and Montecino 2016). In the end, the more the market deteriorates,
the more prohibitive the costs of restoring a positive-sum and reforming.
As the exclusive broadcasting windows do not give enough compensation
for the investments in production, there are low incentives for new entrants
to invest in independent production and take part in the regulatory sys-
tem. In that context, new entrants operate a form of destructive creation,
by avoiding the regulation game altogether, and forcing traditional actors to
imitate them. Indeed, the international platforms adopt a bypass strategy,
using the regulatory heterogeneity between European countries to escape the
regulation imposed on French broadcasters. This gives them a competitive
advantage compared to regulated agents. To escape the French regulatory
framework, Netflix has set up its head office in the Netherlands. The com-
pany therefore has no obligation to contribute to the funding of audiovisual
production in France, nor any obligation to promote French works on its
service. Moreover, the editorial approach based on a personalized recom-
mendation algorithm does not allow the application of broadcasting quotas
in a manner similar to that of traditional channels.
Although not subject to financing obligations, the video-on-demand ser-
vice does invest in French production (Marseille 2015, Plan Coeur (2018)
Deutsch les Landes (2018) ...). However, contrary to the incumbents’ obliga-
tory investments, the platform retains the copyright of the purchased works.
This is still a winning situation for large producers working with platforms:
they still gain from keeping the regulation as it stands, capturing funding
both from regulated and non-regulated players.
The incumbents’ best response strategy to compete with these new en-
trants is to enter the market for SVOD platforms: traditional Pay-TV op-
erator CANAL+ launched the service MyCanal, followed by the free-TV
broadcasters TF1, M6 and France Te´le´visions with Salto.
Bellon 2016 explains the difficulties for the regulation to integrate the new
entrants by the diverging interests of the institutional structures in charge.
The Ministry of Economy seeks to encourage activity and digital technology,
while the Ministry of Culture’s main objective is to preserve the system of
support for creation and the cultural exception. In addition, the development
of a French player capable of competing with the international platforms is
hampered by regulatory authorities, less attentive to the political objectives
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set by each ministry than to compliance with competition rules in the audio-
visual and telecommunications markets.
Indeed, the French new media services are subject to a heavier regulation
than international platforms: in the 08/12/2019 decision11 , the French com-
petition authority imposes on Salto to limit its joint purchases of linear and
non-linear broadcasting rights. In addition, Salto’s supply conditions will be
regulated in several ways, to limit its ability to supply exclusive content to
its parent companies.
4.4 Conclusion
The French audiovisual ecosystem is formed by two very separate subsys-
tems, TV and cinema, whose separation has been created and kept on by
the regulation. The production ecosystem is formed by large suppliers who
benefit from economies of scale in the production of recurrent products, and
a large number of small firms with very little capital. The rise of TV series
as the main premium fiction program leads to an increase in the capital-
intensity of orders, and to the concentration of supply. The smaller produc-
ers’ lack of capital makes them dependent on the order of TV channels. As
the broadcasters do not have sufficient incentive to invest in programs that
can be valued outside of their exclusive window, the residual property rights
granted to these producers have low value (copyright on programs with low
export/resale potential).
After a first wave of new entrants with the addition of new digital frequen-
cies, this ecosystem is now threatened by the entry of the OTT players, made
possible by the adoption of broadband access. This, accompanied by changes
in modes of consumption is turning the television game into a negative-sum
one.
The adaptation of the ecosystem to this new industrial paradigm cannot
be achieved by way of reform, as disrupting the status quo would incur pro-
hibitive costs for the reformer. Indeed, the strong path dependency effects
attached to the regulation means that a reform will have more difficulties
attacking the core of the institution, which is defended by a series of inher-
itances and vetoes from interest groups. In that context, it is possible that
the new entrants, by succeeding in avoiding regulatory control will operate a
11de´cision 19-DCC-157 du 12 aouˆt 2019
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destructive creation, by making obsolete the institutional frame of the French
audiovisual and cinema markets. The choice made by the French regulator
to disintegrate broadcast from content production has kept down the mar-
ket value of audiovisual copyrights. This choice corresponded to a balance
kept between regulated broadcasters and disintegrated producers so to keep
the ecosystem under political control. The transfer of asset value from the
broadcasters to independent producers may eventually benefit to non-French
players who will in the end purchase the wealthiest production companies.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Additional Tables
Audiovisual obligations
Free-to-air channels Pay-TV channels Cinema channels/CANAL+
Choice 1 Choice 2
Independence Clause 75% of investments
AV works 15% NA 15% NA
Heritage works 10.5% 12.5% 8.5% 3.6%
Cinema obligations
Non-specialized channel Specialized channel 1st broadcast-specialized CANAL+
Independence Clause 75% of investment
European Movies 3.2% 21% 26% 12.5%
French Movies 2.5% 17% 22% 9.5%
Table 4.5: Simplified representation of obligatory investments
COSIP (public subsidy) Broadcasters French private Investment Foreign Investment
2007 88 562 117 28
2008 99 601 111 29
2009 79 545 89 19
2010 75 551 97 24
2011 81 584 113 40
2012 75 498 87 50
2013 78 523 111 28
2014 71 501 121 47
2015 67 476 93 20
2016 83 552 112 53
2017 79 505 125 30
2018 84 534 147 29
Table 4.6: Fiction Funding (2007-2018), M¤
CNC and regional subsidies Broadcasters investment Distributors (guaranteed minimum) Foreign private investment French private investment
2007 51,3 319,4 193,5 68,9 394,1
2008 54,7 362,2 335,1 22,3 473,9
2009 53,6 315,3 154,6 52 367,8
2010 70,4 389,7 192,8 80,8 438
2011 61,7 380 223,5 91,2 399,3
2012 56,8 359,6 209,3 87,1 404,3
2013 65 291,8 257,4 94,6 374,1
2014 63,2 291,4 144,9 81,3 300,9
2015 67,6 378 147,9 56,1 379,7
2016 69,2 315 256,5 52 525,1
2017 70,9 363,3 192,5 102,4 472
2018 68 281,7 136,8 52,7 443,7
Table 4.7: Cinema Funding (2007-2018), M¤
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Shortcom Sitcom Serie 52’ Serie 90’ TV movie
2007 43 281 262 53 168
2008 69 369 267 33 174
2009 68 260 198 42 184
2010 46 253 166 49 216
2011 77 220 241 62 174
2012 124 245 213 52 134
2013 172 168 270 64 108
2014 127 192 257 50 124
2015 104 196 276 61 105
2016 135 200 405 62 95
2017 139 292 340 18 82
2018 75 438 354 23 105
Table 4.8: Number of fiction hours
Audiovisual programs Fiction programs
2007 0,52 0,70
2008 0,55 0,71
2009 0,52 0,69
2010 0,54 0,70
2011 0,52 0,69
2012 0,64 0,75
2013 0,57 0,71
2014 0,60 0,73
2015 0,62 0,73
2016 0,60 0,74
2017 0,57 0,74
2018 0,59 0,73
Table 4.9: Gini indexes
4.5.2 Hierarchical upward classification
Audiovisual Database
The hierarchical upward classification allows us to obtain a partition of the
population into homogeneous groups.
The objective of the model is to divide n individuals (production com-
panies) into a given number of classes. Classification is based on a measure
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of dissimilarity, or distance between individuals. The goal is to minimize
the distance between individuals within a group and to maximize it between
groups.
We choose here to use a hierarchical upward classification algorithm which
has the advantage of allowing an ex-post choice in the number of classes. We
start from a situation where all individials are alone in a class, then are
grouped into larger and larger classes, grouping at each stage the nearest
classes in the sense of the distance measurement chosen.
Let Ω Be the entire study population. We define,H, a hierarchy so that:
Ω ∈ H (4.1)
∀ω ∈ Ω, {ω} ∈ H (4.2)
∀(h, h′) ∈ H2, (h ∩ h′ = ∅) ∨ (h ⊂ h′) ∨ (h′ ⊂ h) (4.3)
At the top of the hierarchy, all individuals are grouped into a single class.
At the bottom, all individuals are alone. So we start from n classes and try
to reduce this number to p classes, with p arbitrary. At each step, the two
closest classes are merged. We call aggregation index the distance between
those two classes. Since the closest individuals are grouped first, the first
iteration has a low aggregation index, which will increase from iteration to
iteration.
For the estimation of the model, we use the Ward method, aiming to
maximize the inter-class inertia, defined as follows:
d(C1, C2) =
n1n2
n1 + n2
d(G1, G2) (4.4)
with n1 et n2 the number of individuals within each class, and G1 et G2 their
respective center of gravity.
Inertia, or the within-cluster sum of squares criterion, can be recognized
as a measure of how internally coherent clusters are. It suffers from various
drawbacks:
Inertia makes the assumption that clusters are convex and isotropic, which
is not always the case. It responds poorly to elongated clusters, or manifolds
with irregular shapes. Inertia is not a normalized metric: we just know that
lower values are better and zero is optimal. But in very high-dimensional
spaces, Euclidean distances tend to become inflated (this is an instance of
the so-called “curse of dimensionality”). Running a dimensionality reduction
algorithm such as PCA prior to the clustering can alleviate this problem and
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speed up the computations.
Once the hierarchy is established, the choice of the number of classes
chosen is arbitrary, as the model is primarily descriptive. However, different
criteria can be used to ensure the relevance of this choice. We present in de-
tails the methodology adopted for the classification of audiovisual producers,
then present the results for the cinema producers.
First, we determine the variables of interest used to classify producers.
This selection is made by means of a principal component analysis on the
centered and reduced variables. The procedure gives us principal axes sum-
marizing the information by operating a reduction of dimensionality. We
choose to keep 3 components, accounting for around 75% of the information
(table 4.10). The model is run of the following variables:
• Devis : is the total budget for all productions of an industrial group
• Nbf ilm : isthetotalnumberofproductionsHeures : isthetotalnumberofhoursproduced
• gAnim ; gDocu ; gFict ; gMaga ; gSpec : are the budgets used
by genre (respectively animation, documentary, fiction, magazine and
live entertainment )
• F100 : is the number of movies with a funding entirely french
• MINO : is the number of movies with a foreign funding share below
50
• MAJO : is the number of movies with a foreign funding share above
50
Table 4.11 shows the position of the variables on each axis of the selected
components. We generate a cluster analysis from these coordinates.
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 5,47106 4,10702 0,4974 0,4974
Comp2 1,36404 0,26643 0,124 0,6214
Comp3 1,09761 0,0840711 0,0998 0,7212
Table 4.10: Principal components analysis
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Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3
zdevis 0,3563 0,3046 -0,2832
znbf ilm 0,3973 -0,2636 0,0142
zheures 0,4005 -0,0777 -0,004
zgAnim 0,0624 0,393 0,3367
zgDocu 0,3259 -0,3683 -0,023
zgFict 0,2701 0,3822 -0,5123
zgMaga 0,1079 -0,2661 0,391
zgSpec 0,2688 0,1618 0,2912
zF100 0,3682 -0,354 0,002
zMAJO 0,3423 0,1926 -0,0088
zMINO 0,1875 0,3691 0,5527
Table 4.11: Principal components analysis: variable projections
We then define a producer by its coordinates in the plane formed by the
three principal axes:
P = (x, y, z) ∈ P (4.5)
We then generate the hierarchy, illustrated in figure 4.9.
Figure 4.8: Dendogram for cluster analysis
In order to chose the number of classes, we use two criteria. First, the
Calinski Pseudo-F criterion (Calin´ski and Harabasz 1974) corresponds to a
weighting of the intra-group variance by the number of groups. The higher
the value of the index, the better the cut. Secondly, we use the Duda crite-
rion (Richard O. Duda 2000), given at each step by the ratio between the
sum of standard deviations of the groups to be devided (Je(1)) and the sum
of the standard deviations of the two resulting subgroups Je(2). A high value
of this index indicates a good cut. Table 4.12 presents the evolution of the
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two criteria for each number of classes.
As a first step, we choose 5 classes. The fourth group is differentiated
only by a large foreign funded production. In a concern of clarity we decided
to merge it with the third group Large producers .
Results of the model are presented in the main chapter, table 4.2.
Number of Clusters Calinski/ Harabasz (Pseudo-F) Duda (Je(2) / Je (1))
2 1347,54 0,4703
3 1508,87 0,7236
4 1374,14 0,5664
5 1357,08 0,7123
6 1356,41 0,5184
7 1404,6 0,5448
8 1495,67 0
9 1641,92 0,5469
10 1648,57 0,6088
11 1690,66 0,6017
12 1739,45 0,701
13 1746,33 0,4774
14 1763,65 0,6114
15 1774,93 0,6075
Table 4.12: Duda and Calinski indicators
Cinema classification
The same model is estimated for cinema producers. We use the following
variables:
• montant : is the budget of the movies produced
• mttEq : is the budget divided by the number of coproducers. This
biased variable is used in absence of a precise breakdown of investments.
• nbf ilm : isthenumberofproductionsF100 : isthenumberofmovieswithafundingentirelyfrench
• MINO : is the number of movies with a foreign funding share below 50
• MAJO : is the number of movies with a foreign funding share above 50
• act : is the number of active year on the period
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Our three main components represent 94% of the information.
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 5,04129 3,93632 0,7202 0,7202
Comp2 1,10497 0,691038 0,1579 0,878
Comp3 0,413934 0,145579 0,0591 0,9372
Table 4.13: Principal components: cinema
Below, the position of the variables on each axis of the selected compo-
nents.
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3
zmontant 0,4065 -0,318 0,301
zmttEq 0,3906 -0,3117 0,3889
znbf ilm 0,4384 0,0638 -0,0446
zF100 0,4185 -0,1824 -0,1747
zMAJO 0,3967 0,017 -0,2154
zMINO 0,2001 0,7774 0,5583
zact 0,3428 0,3998 -0,6063
Table 4.14: Principal components: cinema, projection
Figure 4.9: Dendogram for cluster analysis (cinema)
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Number of Clusters Calinski/ Harabasz Pseudo-F Duda Je(2) / Je (1)
2 626,38 0,5809
3 905,54 0,5981
4 1112,25 0,5745
5 1248,7 0,5744
6 1163,32 0,497
7 1139,72 0,4411
8 1168,97 0,6658
9 1169,44 0,4253
10 1153,48 0,2804
11 1156,33 0,6401
12 1169,69 0,454
13 1191,42 0,7049
14 1204,5 0,5957
15 1192,63 0,4984
Table 4.15: Duda and Calinski criterion: cinema
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Conclusion
Media publish narratives which add meaning to various goods. They help
building and publishing public images, representing and complementing all
economic, social, cultural and political activities. They are a source of ex-
ternalities, which can be positive (sharing of knowledge, coordination, syn-
chronization...) or negative (disinformation, rumors, incitement to crime...).
Such externalities can also link different media, or industries. Thus television
maintains externalities with cinema, music or even sport. The way these ex-
ternal effects are captured is central to the study of media ecosystems. This
form of industrial organization directly results from the internalization of
such effects, and differences in the way to deal with them explains the large
divergences in industrial paths among countries (chapter 1).
In that regard, the trajectory of evolution of the French audiovisual sector
and its regulation is a good example of the impact of opening of accesses in
a closed ecosystem. Strongly structured by the regulatory framework result-
ing from the liberalization of State television in the 1980s, this ecosystem
has been strongly protected, and dominated by terrestrial broadcasting. The
logic of the public service concessions system adopted in 1982 was to grant
protected markets in exchange for production and broadcasting obligations
that would serve cultural objectives. To limit the power of the television
channels, vertical restrictions were imposed, and property rights of the pro-
grams they invested in would be kept by the producer. This led to the
creation of a large ecosystem of small producers, dependent on the obliga-
tory funding system to exist.
Until the 2000s, the various players in the industry were able to share rents
in a positive-sum game. The progress in broadcasting techniques, leading
in particular to a fall in barriers to entry, poses a threat to this ecosystem.
The increase in the number of licensed terrestrial channels, allowing entry of
new broadcasters has however been internalized by incumbents, through the
acquisition of these firms, and thanks to the growth of the television mar-
ket. The market penetration of new global players, with new offers adapted
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to changes in consumption patterns poses a new challenge to the ecosystem
and raises questions about the relevance of the regulatory framework and the
possibilities for reform.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the investment strategies of broadcast-
ers, which are subject to obligations to contribute to independent production.
We show how they are more likely to invest in projects driven by large pro-
duction structures, or leaders, in order to minimize risk and maximize the
expected live audience. We also show some signs of horizontal differentia-
tion between the main television channels. However, we do not consider any
counterfactual to investment obligations, or the actual willingness of broad-
casters to pay for each project. As a result, it is difficult to isolate the effect
of the investment obligations on strategic choice, or to quantify more pre-
cisely the possible substitutions effects between investments in cinema and
in TV fiction.
Chapter 3 focuses on the demand side, more specifically on the consump-
tion patterns of television series. While this format has long been overshad-
owed by cinema in France, it expanded quite early in the United States with
satellite pay-TV. The vertically integrated studio model encourages broad-
casters to producer their own content and promote their brand. HBO, Show-
time or AMC then began to target a young, urban, cultivated audience, with
more demanding and daring series from a narrative point of view (Ziemniak
2017). This contributes to the emergence and persistence of a qualitative
gap between French and American series, while series with longer episodes
and narratives (structured around blocks of one and a half hours) persist in
France. This delay in the relative development of the French series is also
explained by the regulatory orientation of pay-TV towards cinema rather
than audiovisual fiction.
The popularity of modern television series formats grew in France in the mid-
2000s, with the arrival of American procedurals, such as CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation on private channels, drawing high audiences. The recent growth
of 52-minute-episodes series indicates a transition to more industrialized pro-
duction processes and is reflected in an increase in the capital intensity of
French audiovisual programs (see chapter 4).
The evolution of broadcasting technologies, and the rise of online video ser-
vices has profoundly affected demand for TV series. This chapter therefore
focuses on the new forms of consumption of these programs. The rational
addiction framework allows us to show how the narrative structure of some
series may influence consumption patterns. However, if serials create a cap-
tive audience for subscription-based on-demand video platforms, the analysis
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method proposed in this chapter is limited by the nature of the data. It would
be interesting to access the viewing history of identified consumers on plat-
forms, in order to more closely analyse the patterns.
Chapter 4 details more precisely the French audiovisual and cinema pro-
duction ecosystems. They are very compartmentalized, and are dominated
by large production structures capturing most of the regulated funding (chap-
ter 2). They also benefit from economies of scale linked to the production
of recurring products (series, TV film collections). The rise in power of tele-
vision series as the main premium programs reinforces this phenomenon of
concentration in the ecosystem.
The entry of subscription-video-on-demand platforms, bypassing traditional
broadcasting channels leads to a crisis in the investment obligation regime,
historically resulting from the concession of growing and protected markets.
Indeed, in the face of this new competition, the television markets opens up
and is no longer protected. We also show that it loses some growth drivers as
a result of this fall in barriers to entry. While a reform to re-balance the as-
sets of the various players is diagnosed by public authorities, the outcome of
these projects generally end up being path-dependent changes, to use Bruno
Palier’s expression (Palier and Bonoli 1999), in that they do not change the
trajectory of evolution of the regulation.
Thus, the adaptation of the ecosystem cannot be achieved through reform,
because of the heavy path-dependency effects, as well as the veto power of
some players. The beneficiaries of the current regulatory game have a strong
ability to defend their interests, while the potential winners of an institu-
tional change are not organised to defend it. In addition, the mechanics of
licensing and protected markets make each in-depth reform look like a form
of expropriation. In this context, we show how the entry of new players can
bring a form of creative destruction, and unlock the institutional game.
This thesis opens many perspectives for future research. From an em-
pirical point of view, the method developed in chapter 3 can be pursued by
using more precise consumption data, in order to highlight these effects of
addiction to narrative. Chapter 2 highlights the capture of regulated invest-
ments by the largest producers, but the data we use does not allow for a
precise analysis of the effect of obligations on broadcasters’ financing strate-
gies. This work led to a more in-depth analysis of the investment decisions
of television channels in French cinema (Bass 2019). Finally, chapter 4 could
be completed by a more precise analysis of the hearings of the various pro-
ducer unions in the context of the preparation of reform projects. This study
would allow for a more in-depth analysis of the mechanism of institutional
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games, as well as the question of the lobbying of powerful producers and its
tools (professional associations, consultation bodies, etc.), and their interac-
tions with the State institutions in charge of managing the regulatory system.
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Conclusion et Re´sume´ en
franc¸ais
Les me´dias ont vocation a` rendre publics des re´cits qui ajoutent du sens a`
divers biens. Ils contribuent a` la construction et a` la publication d’images
publiques, repre´sentant et comple´tant toutes les activite´s e´conomiques, so-
ciales, culturelles et politiques. Ce processus de publication est ge´ne´rateur
d’externalite´s, qui peuvent eˆtre positives (coordination ou synchronisation,
partage de connaissances, circulation de l’information...) ou ne´gatives (prop-
agation de rumeurs ou fake news, incitation au crime...). De tels effets ex-
ternes peuvent e´galement relier diffe´rents me´dias, ou industries. Ainsi la
te´le´vision entretient des externalite´s avec le cine´ma, la musique ou encore
le sport. La fac¸on dont ces effets sont internalise´s est centrale dans l’e´tude
des e´cosyste`mes de me´dias. De fait, cette forme d’organisation industrielle
re´sulte directement de la capture des effets externes, et les diffe´rences dans
la fac¸on de les traiter expliquent les grandes divergences de trajectoires in-
dustrielles entre les pays (chapitre 1).
A cet e´gard, la trajectoire d’e´volution du secteur audiovisuel franc¸ais et de
sa re´gulation est une bonne illustration de l’impact de l’ouverture des acce`s
dans un e´cosyste`me ferme´. Fortement structure´ par le cadre re´glementaire
issu de la libe´ralisation de la te´le´vision d’E´tat dans les anne´es 1980, cet
e´cosyste`me a e´te´ fortement prote´ge´ de la concurrence exte´rieure, et domine´
par la diffusion hertzienne. La logique du syste`me adopte´ en 1982 e´tait
d’accorder des marche´s prote´ge´s en e´change d’obligations de production et de
diffusion servant des objectifs culturels. Pour limiter le pouvoir des chaˆınes de
te´le´vision, des restrictions verticales leur sont impose´es, et les droits de pro-
prie´te´ des programmes reviennent au producteur. Cela a conduit a` la cre´ation
d’un large e´cosyste`me de petits producteurs, de´pendant de ce syste`me de fi-
nancements obligatoires pour exister.
Jusqu’aux anne´es 2000, les diffe´rents acteurs de l’industrie pouvaient partager
les rentes dans un jeu a` somme positive. Les progre`s des techniques de diffu-
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sion, qui se traduisent notamment par une diminution des barrie`res a` l’entre´e,
constituent de`s lors une menace pour cet e´cosyste`me. L’augmentation du
nombre de chaˆınes hertziennes sous licence, permettant l’entre´e de nouveaux
diffuseurs, a toutefois e´te´ internalise´e par les ope´rateurs historiques, graˆce a`
l’acquisition de ces entreprises et a` la croissance du marche´ de la te´le´vision.
La pe´ne´tration du marche´ par de nouveaux acteurs mondiaux, avec de nou-
velles offres adapte´es a` l’e´volution des modes de consommation, repre´sente
un nouveau de´fi pour l’e´cosyste`me franc¸ais et pose la question de la perti-
nence du cadre re´glementaire et des possibilite´s de re´forme.
Le chapitre 2 donne un aperc¸u des strate´gies d’investissements des dif-
fuseurs, soumis aux obligations de contribution a` la production inde´pendante.
On montre comment ils sont plus susceptibles d’investir dans des projets
porte´s par les grosses structures de production, ou leaders, afin de min-
imiser le risque et de maximiser l’audience en direct espe´re´e. Nous mon-
trons e´galement quelques signes de diffe´renciation horizontale entre les prin-
cipales chaˆınes de te´le´vision. Cependant, nous n’estimons pas de contre-
factuel aux obligations d’investissement, ou la volonte´ re´elle des diffuseurs
de payer pour chaque projet. De ce fait, il est difficile d’isoler l’effet de
l’obligation de financement sur les strate´gies d’investissement, ou de quanti-
fier plus pre´cise´ment les effets de substitutions possibles entre l’investissement
dans le cine´ma et dans la fiction TV.
Le chapitre 3 s’inte´resse a` la demande, et plus pre´cise´ment aux formes de
consommation des se´ries te´le´vise´es. Alors que ce format est longtemps e´clipse´
par le cine´ma en France, la se´rie se de´veloppe aux Etats-Unis avec la te´le´vision
payante par satellite. Le mode`le de studio inte´gre´ verticalement incite les dif-
fuseurs a` produire leur propre contenu et a` promouvoir leur marque. HBO,
Showtime ou encore AMC commencent alors a` cibler un public jeune, urbain,
cultive´, avec des se´ries plus exigeantes et audacieuses d’un point de vue nar-
ratif (Ziemniak 2017). Cela contribue a` l’e´mergence et a` la persistance d’un
e´cart qualitatif entre les se´ries franc¸aises et ame´ricaines, alors que persistent
en France des se´ries aux e´pisodes et a` la narration plus longs (structure´s
autour de blocs d’une heure et demi). Ce retard de de´veloppement relatif de
la se´rie franc¸aise s’explique e´galement par l’orientation re´glementaire de la
te´le´vision payante vers le cine´ma plutoˆt que la fiction audiovisuelle.
La popularite´ des formats de se´ries te´le´vise´es modernes s’accroˆıt en France
au milieu des anne´es 2000, avec l’arrive´e des procedurals ame´ricains, tels que
Les Experts: Miami sur les chaˆınes prive´es, ge´ne´rant une audience e´leve´e.
La croissance re´cente des se´ries de 52 minutes indique une transition vers des
processus de production plus industrialise´s et se traduit par une augmenta-
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tion de l’intensite´ capitalistique des programmes audiovisuels (chapitre 4).
L’e´volution des techniques de diffusion, et la monte´e en puissance des ser-
vices de vide´o en ligne a e´galement profonde´ment affecte´ la demande pour
les se´ries TV.
Ce chapitre s’inte´resse donc aux nouvelles formes de consommation des se´ries
te´le´vise´es. Le cadre d’analyse de l’addiction rationnelle nous permet de mon-
trer comment la structure narrative de certaines se´ries influe sur le mode de
consommation.
Si les se´ries a` e´pisodes suivis cre´ent une audience captive pour les plateformes
de vide´os a` la demande en ligne par abonnement.
La me´thode d’analyse propose´e dans ce chapitre est limite´e par la nature des
donne´es. Il serait en effet inte´ressant d’acce´der a` l’historique de visionnage
de consommateurs identifie´s sur des plateformes afin d’en de´celer les motifs.
Le chapitre 4 de´taille plus pre´cise´ment les e´cosyste`mes de production
audiovisuel et cine´ma franc¸ais. Ceux-ci, tre`s cloisonne´s, sont domine´s par
de grosses structures de production, captant l’essentiel des financements
re´glemente´s (chapitre 2). Ils be´ne´ficient, en outre d’e´conomies d’e´chelle lie´es
a` la production de produits re´currents (se´ries, collections de te´le´films). La
monte´e en puissances des se´ries te´le´vise´es comme principal programme pre-
mium renforce ce phe´nome`ne de concentration de l’e´cosyste`me.
L’entre´e des plateformes de vide´o a` la demande par abonnement, diffusant
en dehors des canaux historiques conduit a` une crise du re´gime des obli-
gations d’investissements, historiquement issu de la concession de marche´s
croissants et prote´ge´s. En effet, face a` cette nouvelle concurrence, le marche´
de la te´le´vision cesse d’eˆtre prote´ge´. On montre e´galement qu’il perd certains
relais de croissance du fait de cette ouverture. Alors qu’une re´forme permet-
tant de re´e´quilibrer les actifs des diffe´rents joueurs est diagnostique´e par les
pouvoirs publics, l’issue des diffe´rents projets peut eˆtre conside´re´e comme
des “path-depedent change”, selon l’expression de Bruno Palier (1999), en ce
qu’ils ne modifient pas la trajectoire d’e´volution de la re´glementation.
Ainsi, l’adaptation de l’e´cosyste`me ne peut se faire par la re´forme, du fait
de la forte de´pendance au sentier et des ve´tos de certains acteurs. Les
be´ne´ficiaires du jeu actuel be´ne´ficient d’une forte capacite´ a` de´fendre leurs
inte´reˆts, tandis que les gagnants potentiels d’une re´forme ne sont pas or-
ganise´s pour la de´fendre. En outre, la me´canique des concessions de li-
cences et de marche´s prote´ge´s fait passer chaque reforme pour une forme
d’expropriation. Dans ce contexte, on montre comment l’entre´e des nou-
veaux acteurs peut ope´rer une forme de destruction cre´atrice, et de´bloquer
le jeu institutionnel.
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Cette the`se ouvre de nombreuses perspectives pour de futures recherches.
D’un point de vue empirique, la me´thode de´veloppe´e dans le chapitre 3
peut eˆtre poursuivie en utilisant des donne´es plus pre´cises de consomma-
tion, afin de mettre en e´vidence ces effets d’addiction au re´cit. Le chapitre
2 met en e´vidence la capture des financements re´glemente´s par les plus gros
producteurs, cependant les donne´es utilise´es ne permettent pas d’analyser
pre´cise´ment l’effet des obligations sur les strate´gies de financement des dif-
fuseurs. Cette analyse a donne´ lieu a` une analyse plus pousse´e des de´cisions
d’investissement des chaˆınes de te´le´vision dans le cine´ma Franc¸ais (Bass
2019). Enfin, le chapitre 4 pourrait eˆtre comple´te´ par une analyse plus
pre´cise des auditions des diffe´rents syndicats de producteurs dans le cadre de
l’e´laboration des projets de re´forme. Cette e´tude permettrait d’analyser plus
en profondeur le me´canisme des jeux institutionnels, ainsi que la question
du lobbying des producteurs puissants et de ses outils (syndicats, organes de
concertation, etc.), et de leurs interactions avec les organes d’E´tat en charge
de la gestion du syste`me re´glementaire.
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MOTS CLE´S
Economie industrielle, re´gulation, audiovisuel cine´ma
RE´SUME´
L’e´cosyste`me de la production audiovisuelle est structure´ par la re´glementation issue de la libe´ralisation de la te´le´vision
d’E´tat (1984-86). Celle-ci accorde aux chaıˆnes des fre´quences hertziennes en e´change d’obligations de financement et
de diffusion. Il en re´sulte un syste`me administre´ dont les re`gles ont tre`s peu e´volue´ en trente ans. Cette organisation
industrielle s’essouffle: la part de marche´ des films franc¸ais en salle stagne, tandis que le public vieillit. La rentabilite´
des chaıˆnes de te´le´vision s’effrite et les fictions qu’elles financent s’exportent mal. L’entre´e des plateformes e´trange`res
telles que Netflix fragmente encore l’audience. L’objectif de ce travail est d’e´tudier l’e´volution de l’industrie audiovisuelle
franc¸aise et de sa re´gulation, depuis la libe´ralisation de la te´le´vision d’E´tat, ainsi que d’analyser l’effet de l’entre´e des
diffuseurs ”over-the-top” sur l’e´cosyste`me historique.
ABSTRACT
The French ecosystem of audiovisual production has been structured by the liberalization of state television (1984-1986).
Radio frequencies were granted to broadcasters in exchange for a commitment to invest a percentage of their turnover
into French production. The result is a heavily regulated system whose rules have changed very little in thirty years. This
industrial organization is showing its limits: the market share of French films in theaters is stagnant, while the audience is
aging. The profitability of TV-channels crumbles and series they finance don’t sell. The entry of foreign platforms such as
Netflix fragments the audience even more. The purpose of this thesis is to study the creation of the industrial ecosystem
of the French Television, its evolution and the impact of the entry of international players on the incumbents’ strategies
and on regulation.
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